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Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) have been approved for use by pilots in flight operations at 
many Part 121 air carriers in the United States since 2010.  As an automated device 
replacing paper in the cockpit, there are many human factor issues that relate to operation 
of the EFB.  EFBs have been cited in accidents and incidents worldwide in large, 
transport category aircraft. While the EFB was not cited as the main cause of the 
accident/incident, it has been listed as a contributing factor.  This study looks at pilot 
perception related to the safety aspect of the EFB in flight operations at Part 121 carriers 
in the United States.  It surveys pilots that utilize the device in daily, routine flight 
operations to determine their perception of the EFB.  The study is followed with a survey 





Statement of the Problem 
 An Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) is a defined by the Federal Aviation 
Administration in Advisory Circular 120-76, dated 9 July 2002, as an "electronic display 
system intended primarily for cockpit/flightdeck or cabin use. EFB devices can display a 
variety of aviation data or perform basic calculations (e.g., performance data, fuel 
calculations, etc.). In the past, some of these functions were traditionally accomplished 
using paper references or were based on data provided to the flightcrew by an airline’s 
“flight dispatch” function" (FAA, 2002, p. 2).   
 Part 121 carriers, such as Southwest Airlines and FedEx, used an early version of 
an EFB during flight operations to calculate takeoff and landing performance data.  
(DOT, 2010).  Jensen (2006) notes that FedEx is considered an EFB pioneer having used 
an EFB, called an Airport Performance Laptop Computer (APLC) since the early 1990s 
(p. 2).  The Southwest EFB is called an Onboard Performance Computer (OPC) and was 
first used in 1997  (Majcher, 2013).  Koebbe (2011) states that early EFBs, such as the 
APLC and OPC, were large, computing devices that relied on permanent mounting 
fixtures and had to be hard wired into the aircraft's electrical system.  These issues 
prevented many airlines from using EFBs in airline operations. 
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 The advent of Apple's iPad in 2010 solved many of the original issues with EFBs 
allowing more widespread use in airplanes.  (Koebbe, 2011).  Since that time, Part 121 
air carriers in the United States have sought and gained certification for pilots to use 
EFBs in flight operations.  The first approval was granted to American Airlines by the 
FAA in 2013 (Huguely, 2013).  Along with American Airlines, many major and regional 
airlines in the United States have attained approval and allow usage of EFBs in flight 
operations, including Delta, Southwest, Frontier, United, Alaska, JetBlue, Virgin 
America, Federal Express, United Parcel Services, American Eagle, and Mesa (Huguely, 
2013; Delta, 2013; Frontier, 2013; McKenna, 2013; JetBlue, 2013; Virgin, 2011; Carey, 
2013). 
 EFBs have been cited in several accident reports in the United States and 
worldwide in airline operations  (NTSB, 2006; ATSB, 2009; CAA, 2013; DOT, 2010)  
Analysis of ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System) reports also cited many human 
factor issues with EFBs during flight (DOT, 2014).  One of the attributing factors is 
electronic display information elements which pertain to scrolling, zooming, information 
being off-screen, difficulty in reading, and incorrect or out-of-date information (DOT, 
2014).  Another contributing factor is self-reported human performance, which includes 
inexperience with the EFB, lack of expertise, distraction, and loss of situational 
awareness (DOT, 2014).  
 There are multiple human factors that relate to pilots utilizing automation.  One 
such factor is referred to as misuse of automation that is defined as an "uncritical reliance 
on the proper function of an automated system without recognizing its limitations and the 
possibilities of automation failures"  (Bahner, Huper & Manzey, 2007, p. 688).  Another 
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human factor element that relates to the EFB is commission errors, which are the result of 
"not seeking out confirmatory or disconfirmatory information, or discounting other 
sources of information in the presence of computer-generated cues" (Bahner et al., 2007, 
p. 689).  Psychologists have termed these two as automation complacency and 
automation bias  (Carr, 2013).   
 In addition to human factor issues relating to EFBs, there are other factors to 
consider concerning the EFBs themselves, such as, fallibility.  "Sooner or later, even the 
most advanced technology will break down, misfire, or in the case of a computerized 
system, encounter circumstances that its designers never anticipated" (Carr, 2013).  Not 
only is there the possibility of EFB hardware failure, i.e., display cracks, the EFB 
software can also fail or work in ways that were not expected by its programmers. 
 Regardless of the potential human factor effects and reliability of EFB hardware 
and software, airline operators have forged ahead equipping airline pilots and airplanes 
with EFBs.  Pilots at Part 121 air carriers have had to adapt to using a new, computerized 
device in the flight deck as opposed to traditional paper that many have used for years 
(FSF, 2005).   It is paramount to flight safety that pilots be able to utilize the EFB in a 
competent manner. Cahill (2006) states: 
 Electronic flight bag usability is critical to flight safety. Poor usability 
(inefficient task workflows and/or confusing information displays) can be costly 
in terms of pilot time/attention and overall workload.  Pilots are continuously 
prioritizing and sequencing flight tasks, at different points in flight. For example, 
to access or make landing calculations, pilots must monitor a range of information 
displays (e.g. flight management system, situation displays, EFB and so forth) and 
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resources (e.g. navigation charts).  Evidently, problems in accessing/making 
landing calculations will distract pilots from the primary task of flying the aircraft 
safely, and could result in a loss of situation awareness at a critical point in flight. 
The accident literature details many accidents where loss of situation awareness 
and/or poor task management contributes to pilot error (p. 1).   
To paraphrase Cahill, it is critical to the safety of flight to understand the nature of the 
EFBs in the flight deck and how pilots’ interaction affects current tasks and workloads. 
Purpose of the Study 
 This study will seek to better ascertain the effects of the EFB on pilot flows and 
workloads by querying pilots on their perception of the EFB since they are the ones 
operating and interacting with the devices.  This study will seek to determine the 
perception of safety in relation to the EFB, as well as, its impact on flows and workload.  
The study will also attempt to determine if there is a correlation between demographics, 
such as, age, type of training, length of use, flight time, corrective lenses, etc., and the 
perception to the usability of the EFB.  After obtaining the data, a small group of airline 
pilots will be interviewed to provide feedback on the results and possibly shed light on 
the nature of the results.  Chandra (2013) agrees that: 
 when crew workload is too high, or too low, performance suffers.  Therefore, it is 
 important to understand how a new system such as an EFB will affect workload 
 patterns.  Workload may be decreased in some ways and increased in other ways.  
 Increased workload could result from inefficient design of the software or 
 hardware, or  even from limitations in the flexibility of using EFBs in relation to 
 paper documents (p. 6). 
			 5	
There have also been concerns of training and implementation at airlines as many pilots 
are unfamiliar with an Electronic Flight Bag in addition to the basic operation of the iPad 
or Surface tablet.  An ASRS report by a Part 121 pilot cites lack of training and 
familiarization as a large problem with the EFB: 
 The company has assumed a level of proficiency with the iPad that doesn’t exist.  
 No standardized procedures as to the display and use of same in the cockpit.  
 Many pilots will not even admit how lost they are as to the use of this new device.  
 This was a very material and incomplete introduction of new technology into the 
 cockpit and I feel very strongly that we didn’t get proper training as a group. 
 (ACN# 1022123) (Chase & Hiltunen, 2010).   
Research Questions 
What is pilot perception regarding the safety impact of EFBs in the flight deck? 
Is the Electronic Flight Bag a distraction to pilots at Part 121 air carriers? 
Does the EFB increase perceived workload as opposed to traditional paper? 
Are there significant, demographic variations among pilot respondents? 
What are pilot reported pros and cons of using an EFB? 
Literature Review 
Electronic Flight Bag 
 While the Electronic Flight Bag is new to airline operations in the United States, 
it is not new to the industry.  There are numerous articles and studies that have been 
conducted concerning EFBs, including design, human factors, accidents and incidents, as 
well as the business case for the EFB as opposed to paper methods.  
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 Regulatory guidance for EFBs is established under Advisory Circular (AC) 120-
76.  There have been three revisions to the original AC, dated in 2002, as the EFB 
hardware and software have evolved over the past eleven years.  The current AC 
guidance is found in AC 120-76C dated May 9, 2014. 
 The Advisory Circular establishes classes of EFBs found in Table 1 in addition to 
software types found in Table 2.  The Advisory Circular also provides guidelines for 
removal of paper products from the flight deck (FAA, 2014, p. 10).  The AC also 
provides guidelines for hardware failures, safety concerns, in addition to, design 
recommendations.  The Advisory Circular issues guidelines for Rapid Decompression 
Testing of Class 1 and 2 type EFBs to ensure that the device can sustain a rapid 
decompression and continue to operate (FAA, 2014, pp. 15-16).   
 AC 20-173, published in 2011, provides guidance on the installation of the EFB 
to components of the aircraft.  This typically applies to Class 3 EFB Hardware 
installations and issues guidance for mounting the EFB, power provisioning, data 
connectivity (wired or wireless), in addition to failure conditions.  Since Class 3 EFBs 
interface with the aircraft, there is more guidance provided by the additional AC (FAA, 









Table 1  





Class 1 EFB Hardware Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
computers with no FAA design, 
production, or installation approval for the 
device or its internal components.  Not 
mounted to the aircraft, connected to 
aircraft systems for data, or connected to a 
dedicated aircraft power supply.  May be 
temporarily connected to an existing 
aircraft power supply for battery 
recharging.  If the EFB contains Type B 
apps for aeronautical charts, approach 
charts, or checklist, it must be secured and 
viewable during critical phases of flight and 
not interfere with flight control movement. 
 
Class 2 EFB Hardware Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
computers with no FAA design, 
production, or installation approval for the 
device or its internal components.  
Typically mounted in the aircraft and must 
be capable of being easily removed from 
mounts and can be temporarily connected 
to aircraft power supply for battery 
recharging.  They may be connected to 
aircraft power, data ports, or installed 
antennas. 
 
Class 3 EFB Hardware Guidance provided by AC 20-173 in 
relation to mounting, power, and data 






Table 2  





Type A Paper replacement for applications intended 
for use during flight planning, on the 
ground, or during non-critical phases of 
flight.  Containing a failure condition 
classification of minor or less. 
 
Type B Paper replacement for aeronautical 
information required to be accessible for 
each flight at the pilot station and used 
during all phases of flight.   
 
Type C Non-EFB software applications found in 
avionics and include intended functions for 
communications, navigation, and 
surveillance that require FAA design, 
production, and installation approval.  
Considered with a failure condition 
classification of major hazard or higher. 
The Case For the Electronic Flight Bag 
 One of the cases in favor of the EFB is the near-elimination of paper from the 
flight deck.  Another reason for the drive to EFB implementation is the “enhanced safety, 
increased efficiency, and lower operating costs”  (FSF, 2005).  According to an April 
2005 FAA study,  
 The business case for deploying EFBs considers may types of benefits to airlines.  
 Relative to traditional avionics, they come at a low initial cost, can be customized 
 and are easily upgraded, making them an open-ended computing platform rather 
 than a packaged system (FSF, 2005). 
 Apple Computer’s release of the iPad in 2010 was a “game-changer” in EFB 
implementation at airlines as it solved many problems with previous EFBs, such as the 
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OPC or APLC.  The following table shows the iPad benefit to airline operators (Koebbe, 
2011). 
 
Table 3  





Weight Savings The iPad weighs 1.3 pounds (as opposed to 
77 pounds of paper manuals (FSF, 2005). 
 
Cost Savings iPad is inexpensive at $499.  Much cheaper 
subscription for charts (a typical aviation 
chart subscription on the iPad is under 
$100 per year. 
 
Versatility Many third-party applications to aid 
inflight 
 
Updating Easy updating with one touch, not 
manually removing and re-inserting charts 
 
Organization Easier to organize charts in-flight; they are 
always in order as opposed to paper that 
can be placed in the incorrect position 
 
Geo-Referencing Ability to show the aircraft position on a 
chart with GPS 
 
 While accidents and incidents have been attributed to the EFB, there have also 
been reports where the EFB has assisted pilots before making errors.  One such case 
involves FedEx in 2004 from a flight between Memphis and Tokyo.  Prior to takeoff, it 
was concluded that the aircraft was too heavy for takeoff.  Under old operating rules prior 
to the EFB, cargo would have been offloaded to accommodate the takeoff; however, the 
EFB provided alternate solutions that allowed the pilots to retain all of the cargo and 
change the aircraft configuration for takeoff (FSF, 2005).   
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 Another potential incident, mentioned by Scott Powell, Jeppesen manager of 
cockpit solutions, referenced a Continental plane that was trailing a truck on a snow-
covered taxiway for taxi guidance.  The truck drove past a turn where the aircraft should 
have gone, and the EFB’s own-ship guidance allowed the pilots to stop the aircraft and 
query ground control before proceeding.  This action prevented the aircraft from 
continuing into a dead-end and having to be towed back (Rosenburg, 2010).   
 The idea of the EFB from an operator’s standpoint makes business sense:  reduce 
paper, reduce subscriptions, reduce costs.  However, there is a potential cost in doing so.  
“So the principle of the EFB is a sound idea that offers the operator gains in air safety and 
efficiency and operation costs reductions.  But for every pro there is a con and whilst the 
pros are attractive the cons can quickly upset the equilibrium by turning foresight into 
failure or at worse, disaster”  (Johnstone, 2013). 
Human Factors Relating to Automation and the EFB 
 Captain Chesley Sullenberger, the infamous captain of US Airway Flight 1549 
that ditched into the Hudson River in 2009, admits that, “the pilots and technology are 
failing together.  If we look only at the pilots – the human factor – then we are ignoring 
other important factors.  We have to look at how they work together”  (Lowy, 2011).  
Richard Kemmler, a former flight psychologist for Lufthansa, believes that “visually 
speaking, they have reached the limits of what the human sensory perception system can 
handle” (Traufetter, 2009, p. 5).   
 The definition of a “normal” pilot has changed over the years with the 
introduction of automation into the flight deck.  Whereas pilots at one time utilized 
piloting skills, such as stick-and-rudder, pilotage, and dead-reckoning, their function now 
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has become more of a manager of systems (Pasztor, 2013; Salas, 2010, p192).  This shift 
to a manager yields a mental burden to pilots that Salas defines as “the relation between 
the function relating the mental resources demanded by a task and those resources 
supplied by the human operator (Salas, 2010).  
 The issues relating to human factors with the EFB and automation include 
automation bias and complacency, in addition to distraction, efficiency, and reliability 
and trust.  “Designers tend to automate everything that leads to an economic benefit and 
leave the operator to manage the resulting system”  (Parasuraman, 1997).  However, by 
doing so, “their efforts to compensate for the unreliability of human performance, the 
designers of automated control systems have unwittingly created opportunities for new 
error types that can be even more serious than those they were seeking to avoid”  
(Reason, 2011, p.46).  Leaving the pilot in such a situation can be detrimental as several 
aircraft manufacturers have expressed.  “Concerned about the hazards of cockpit 
“information overload”, a draft report told the FAA that, “today’s technology allows for 
too much information to be presented to the pilot" (Pasztor, 2013).  Salas (2010) also 
agrees stating that, “one of the challenges of the high technology cockpit is avoiding 
potential visual overload, as most data are acquired visually” (p. 165).   
 Flight Safety Foundation studies of aviation and psychology have revealed that 
automation does not necessarily make the pilot’s job easier.  First of all, pilots are 
familiar with using paper charts in the aircraft for navigation.  Having used them for 
many years, pilots have “developed highly efficient and individualized strategies for 
retrieving chart information for reference and planning purposes” (FSF, 2005).  Even if 
paper charts are removed from the flight deck with the introduction of the EFB, “most 
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pilots are so familiar with using paper charts that it will take some time for them to 
become as comfortable with electronic charts as they are with paper charts”  (FSF, 2005; 
DOT, 2003).  A study by the Flight Safety Foundation also finds that: 
 using an EFB requires effort.  There may be effort involved in locating and 
 orienting the display for use and there is effort in looking at the display, 
 processing the information and making any necessary entries.  Data entry can 
 produce particularly long head-down times and high workload.  Visual scanning 
 of the EFB (without data entry) does not require as much effort, but it is still an 
 additional task for the pilot.  The additional workload required to use an EFB may 
 distract the pilot from higher-priority time-critical tasks during critical phases of 
 flight (FSF, 2005, p. 35).   
 Pilots of automated aircraft have also been queried about their attitudes toward 
cockpit systems.  “A notable finding was that only a minority of the pilots agreed with 
the statement, “automation reduces workload”  (Parasuraman, 1997, p. 234).   Most pilots 
agree that increases in automation also increase their workload.   EFBs have also been 
attributed to negative side-effects noting that “they could increase workload and head-
down time, and distract the flight crew from higher priority tasks”  (DOT, 2003, p. v).   
 “Riley (1989) studied factors that might influence a person's decision to use 
automation that relate to how much workload the operator is experiencing in addition to 
the perceived risk involved” (p. 124).  This research suggests that many pilots many not 
be inclined to using automation, such as the EFB, when workload is high.   
 A recent study of ASRS as well at other aviation accident and incident databases 
revealed numerous human factors in relation to the EFB.  The results produced 335 
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unique reports in reference to the EFB or PED that were categorized into human factors 
(DOT, 2014).  Table 4 shows the results of the report. 
Table 4  
Human Factor Concern from ASRS and CAA Report 
 
Number of Reports 
 
Human Factor 
132 Electronic display information elements 
pertaining to the use of electronic charts, in 
particular scrolling and zooming 
 
125 Inexperience/lack of experience and 
distraction, unfamiliar with limitations of 
EFB, lost position awareness, became 
preoccupied with the EFB and failed other 
duties 
 
62 Hardware equipment error or failure or 
screen legibility concerns related to the 
displays brightness or readability 
 
16 Placement, mounting, stowage; pilot had 
poor view of the EFB/PED; inadvertent 
activation of EFB controls; unsecured EFB 
on the flight deck 
 
 Aviation expert, David Learmount, has been asking pilots and labor leaders what 
role that the pilot should play in this system in the future. 
 The pilots themselves are calling for a discussion of how their profession sees 
 itself. "We have to turn men and computers into a jointly operating unit," says 
 Nikolaus Braun of the pilots' union Cockpit. More technology, he says, should by 
 no means mean less human presence in the cockpit. On the contrary, pilots 
 become even more necessary as system complexity grows. "Their training has to 
 be improved, not reduced," says Fran Hoyas of the European Cockpit Association 
 (ECA)” (Traufetter, 2009, p. 5).   
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Automation Complacency and Bias 
 Psychologists have found in studies that when humans work with computers, they 
fall victim to two cognitive ailments:  automation complacency and automation bias  
(Carr, 2013).  These two factors weaken performance and lead to mistakes.   
 Automation complacency, by definition, occurs when a computer lulls a human 
into a false sense of security.  Having confidence that the computer will work without 
error and handle any problem that arises, humans allow their attention to drift.  This 
results in disengagement from work and awareness of what is occurring around (Carr, 
2013). 
 Automation bias refers to a condition where humans place too much faith in 
automation or information coming from computers.  The information becomes so strong 
that people begin to ignore other sources of information (Carr, 2013).   
 Salas and Maurino (2010) notes that “this flawed judgment has been identified as 
a factor in professional pilot judgment errors”  (p. 165).   He continues to further define 
two classes of technology-related errors that commonly are seen in hybrid decision-
making environments.  One is omission errors that are defined as failures to respond to 
system irregularities or events when automation devices fail to detect or indicate them.  
The second is commission errors which occur when decision makers incorrectly follow 
an automation-based directive or recommendation without verifying it against other 
available information.  (Salas & Maurino, 2010).   
Distraction 
 When the design of a new system enters the flight deck, “it is important that the 
pilot’s expectations of how the aircraft operates are not violated by the EFB.  If the EFB 
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is incompatible with the overall flight deck design, pilots will have trouble learning to use 
it, and they will be more likely to make errors”  (DOT, 2003, p. 10).  Without this 
consideration, the EFB can be a distraction to pilots.  Other considerations in reference to 
distraction stem from legibility of text and screens, as well as the security of the device to 
prevent movement during takeoff and landing (Chandra, 2013; FSF, 2005).  Another 
distraction to pilots could result from the EFB shifting during aircraft 
acceleration/deceleration (FSF, 2005).  The Flight Safety Foundation also found 
distractions that pilots may experience using the EFB during high workload situations can 
prevent the pilots from scanning for traffic and also monitoring aircraft systems (FSF, 
2005).   
 Reason (2011) states that, “here then is another irony of automation: flight 
management systems designed to ease the pilot’s mental burden tend to be most 
enigmatic and attention-demanding during periods of maximum workload” (pp. 44-45).   
 A recent ASRS report from an anonymous Captain at a regional airline details a 
taxiway excursion due to the EFB being a distraction.  The narrative reports: 
 We had cleared Runway 16R after a normal landing.  The EFBs were set up with 
 the correct airport diagrams, arrival, and approach plates. After clearing the 
 runway, we were given taxi instructions to the ramp. As a flight crew, we were 
 familiar with the airport but needed the airport diagrams to reference for the taxi 
 instructions. I attempted to switch pages from the approach plate to the airport 
 diagram, but doing so with the right hand while using the left to operate the tiller 
 and having to look away from the front window is a major distraction. A brief 
 excursion from the taxiway centerline occurred but was quickly corrected. I had 
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 to stop the airplane and set the parking brake on the taxi in  to properly adjust the 
 EFB to scroll to the corresponding location of the airport and adjust the zoom 
 level so that it was useful and readable. The EFBs have very small touch points 
 that are really close together, which might actually be too small for some adult 
 human  fingers…even if the user taps the screen with the tip of a pen. The touch 
 locations should be re-calibrated so that they actually match the picture of the 
 touch button more closely (“Paperless”, 2010, pp. 1-2).   
This report is only one example of how the EFB can be a distraction to the crew and 
allow the aircraft to enter an undesired aircraft state (not on the centerline) that could 
potentially lead to a more dangerous, unrecoverable incident or accident. 
 Another ASRS report cites how the EFB can be a distraction during critical 
phases of flight:  "Both EFB's locked up while in precipitation static while descending in 
clouds on [RNAV arrival], Copilot was flying. We were deviating for rain showers when 
both EFB's froze. Displays still worked, but no inputs on screens worked. Got out of seat 
to get paper backup charts stored in galley area. Bad time for major distraction. (ACN# 
1084179)" (Chase, 2014, pp. 26-27).   
Efficiency 
 Studies have been conducted in relation to pilot efficiency using the EFB.  One 
quantitative study was conducted in 2004 where pilots were measured on their response 
to EFB inputs.  It was discovered that pilot interaction with the EFB was significantly 
slower than paper by approximately seven seconds on the EFB (Hamblin, 2004).  
Another study was conducted in 2005 and found that an EFB was perceived by the 
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participants to be slower than paper, and data input was slower and more frustrating.  The 
participants also felt that their workload was increased by using the EFB (Cahill, 2006).   
 FSF (2005) believes that "increased workload could result from inefficient design 
of the software or hardware, or even from limitations in the flexibility of using EFBs in 
relation to paper documents" (p. 33).  While the inefficiency may increase workload in 
some areas, efficiency may decrease workload in other areas.  The key to understanding 
efficiency is the overall net workload effect to the pilots.  FSF (2005) confirms that, " 
Although workload might increase with electronic documents, this negative quality is 
offset by other factors, such as the improved electronic search capabilities and the fact 
that documents are typically referenced in low workload conditions. Overall, the net 
increase in workload may be judged acceptable" (p. 34).  The report also states that, "the 
operator should understand in advance how workload patterns will change and should 
decide whether the changes will be acceptable. Any evaluation of the EFB-related 
workload should consider the time required to perform a specific task with an EFB, 
compared to the time required without an EFB. Related factors include the accessibility 
of the EFB controls and the EFB display, the amount of automation provided by the EFB 
and characteristics of the EFB software. Other considerations are whether errors would 
be more likely during periods of heavy workloads, how difficult error-recovery would be 
and whether efforts to resolve EFB problems would be likely to distract pilots from other 
tasks (FSF, 2005, p. 33).   
 EFB inefficiency is detailed in the following ASRS report that add to crew 
frustration, confusion and workload: 
 After stabilized, we attempted to locate the buffet speed chart in the manual on 
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 our iPads. It took me three attempts to login (error message about no wi-fi signal) 
 and a total of more than 5 minutes to get to the performance section. No amount 
 of searches could locate the appropriate document via the search function. I 
 finally searched page by page in the performance chapter and found it. The use of 
 the iPad is not intuitive and would be vastly improved had I received instruction 
 when given the iPad. (ACN# 1068232) (Chase, 2014, p. 31).   
A crew of three, type-rated Boeing 777 pilots detail the following report citing EFB 
inefficiency as a precursor to an accident or incident: 
 I attempted to locate the taxi-in checklist on the ECL [Electronic Check List] 
 under the un-annunciated checklists and several other areas of the ECL to no 
 avail. The entire crew became frustrated and confused as to why three company 
 777 type rated pilots could not find the checklist for proper tow in procedures… 
 We never found the checklist and were towed in using procedures we believed to 
 be appropriate lacking any AFM or Checklist guidance. Our lack of training on 
 new procedures, the location of checklists and use of the new AFM changes is  
 overwhelming and dangerous. These procedures and the lack of quality training 
 [are] going to cause damage to aircraft and injury to personnel. (ACN# 976947) 
 (Chase, 2014, pp. 31-32). 
Airline pilots that are using EFBs in line operations are not able to judge whether or not 
the changes from paper to EFB are acceptable.  Operators have implemented EFB 
utilization and procedures, and pilots must adapt to interfacing with the EFB regardless of 
its efficiency or lack thereof. 
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Reliability and Trust 
 Reliability and trust in automation go hand in hand in that without reliability, 
there is no trust on the part of the user with the converse being true as well.  "Automation 
is often problematic because people fail to rely upon it appropriately. Because people 
respond to technology socially, trust influences reliance on automation" (Lee & See, 
2004, p. 50).  Parasuraman (1997) notes that, “a factor in the development of trust is 
automation reliability.  Several studies have shown that operators’ use of automation 
reflects automation reliability”  (p. 237).  Therefore, “trust often determines automation 
usage.  Operators may not use a reliable automated system if the believe it to be 
untrustworthy.  Conversely, they may continue to rely on automation even when it 
malfunctions”  (Parasuraman, 1997, p. 236).  
 A review of ASRS reports found the following narrative that describes the lack of 
reliability and trust that can be created by pilots using an EFB. 
I decided to intercept the [last leg of route] …to save time. When I made the turn, 
I realized on both the moving map on my panel GPS as well as the commercial 
chart software that I had running on a tablet PC as a back-up moving map, that the 
leg would cut across the southern edge of ZZZ’s Class D airspace. In HDG mode 
on the autopilot, I proceeded to fly south of ZZZ’s airspace, which on both 
moving maps was indicated to be a 5 nm radius from the ZZZ airport from the 
surface to 3,200 MSL. Even though I was at 3,500 MSL, I didn’t want to get near  
ZZZ’s airspace. I passed approximately 8 nm south of ZZZ airport according to 
both moving maps. As I got past ZZZ, for some odd reason I decided to look at 
my sectional to make sure I was clear of the Class D airspace, and to my horror, I 
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found that what was depicted on both commercial databases was WRONG! The 
Class D airspace for ZZZ on the current database is depicted as a 5 nm radius 
from the ZZZ airport with a top of 3,200 feet MSL. When I look at the current 
sectional, it is depicted as a 5 nm radius from the surface to 8,000 feet MSL, and a 
10 nm ring from 2,000 to 8,000 feet MSL [actually the ZZZ TRSA]. I had 
unintentionally incurred upon this outer ring by 2 nm and 1,300 feet above the 
floor. This was the third flight I made in the past week along this similar route! 
Each time, I relied on the data from three commercial sources along with the 
airspace depicted in the panel GPS from a commercial chart maker to help me 
avoid airspace along my route (“Paperless”, 2010, p.2).   
Incidents similar to this develop distrust among pilots since the EFB provided inaccurate 
information.  As airline pilots are now required to carry and use EFBs on the flight decks, 
many without paper charts for a backup, there is no method to verify the accuracy of the 
EFB, which may create a distrust in the accuracy of the information provided by the EFB. 
Accidents and Incidents 
 The following accidents and incidents have been attributed to usage of an EFB.  
While not the major cause of the accident or incident, the EFB has been cited as a 
contributing factor.  “Cockpit automation has played a role in several accidents by 
confusing pilots, particularly when they become startled or the equipment acted in 
unusual ways, Rory Kay, the former air safety chairman of the Air Line Pilots 
Association, said in an interview” (Levin, 2013, p. 1). 
 A report released by the US National Aviation of Sciences (NAS) described 
several aircraft incidents in which pilots confused various computer settings.  The 
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software performed as it was designed to perform, but not the way the pilot’s expected it 
to.  “Programs have become so complex that they can hardly be tested for all 
eventualities anymore” (Traufetter, 2009, p. 1). 
 On March 20, 2009, an Emirates Airbus A-340 taking off from Melbourne, 
Australia sustained a tail strike during the takeoff roll and subsequently overran the end 
of the runway.  The investigation found that erroneous data was entered into the EFB 
during pre-flight which resulted in an incorrect takeoff weight being entered.  Other 
factors contributed to the incorrect takeoff weight not being discovered on subsequent 
checks (ATBS, 2009). 
 On April 14, 2012, a Boeing 737 sustained damage to the rear fuselage skin 
during a tail strike on takeoff from Chambery Airport, France.  The investigation 
revealed that the commander (pilot-in-command) failed to enter the takeoff weight into 
the EFB during preflight preparation.  Unbeknownst to the crew, if the takeoff weight 
was not entered into the EFB, the EFB would enter the default takeoff weight from the 
previous flight.  As a result, incorrect speed and thrust were calculated and used for the 
takeoff.  The airspeed at rotation was too low and the pitch angle substantially high that 
impacted the tail onto the runway.  The investigation revealed a wider problem with the 
general design and use of EFB computers in the flight deck (CAA, 2013). 
 A similar incident to the France crash involved a Boeing 747 taking off from 
Halifax in 2004.  The investigation revealed that the takeoff parameters in Halifax were 
identical to the takeoff parameters from their previous departure at Bradley International 
Airport.  TSB Canada cited that one of the causes to the EFB retaining “all the previous 
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takeoff performance calculations” from Bradley.  The crash fatally injured the crew 
(CAA, 2013). 
Table 5  
Large Aircraft Accident/Incidents Involving EFBs 
Year Operator Aircraft Type Location 
07/31/1997 FedEx 14 McDonnell-Douglass MD-11 Newark, New Jersey 
10/14/2004 MK Airlines 1602 Boeing 747 Halifax, Nova Scotia 
12/08/2005 Southwest Airlines 1248 Boeing 737 Chicago, Illinois 
03/20/2009 Emirates 407 Airbus A-340 Melbourne, Australia 
04/24/2012 Titan Airways Boeing 737 Chambery, France 
 
 In the United States, Southwest Airlines overran runway 31C at Chicago Midway 
Airport on December 8, 2005 resulting in one fatality on the ground.  The subsequent 
NTSB investigation revealed that a contributing factor to the crash was “the 
programming and design of the Onboard Performance Computer (OPC), which did not 
present inherent assumptions in the program critical to pilot decision-making”  (NTSB, 
2006, p. 67).   The NTSB recommendation: 
 Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to ensure 
 that all  on board electronic computing devices they use automatically and clearly 
 display critical performance calculation assumptions (NTSB, 2006, p. 49). 
 Another accident involved FedEx landing at Newark International Airport on July 
31, 1997.  FedEx, like Southwest, at the time, utilized an onboard computer to calculate 
airfield takeoff and landing performance calculations called the Airport Performance 
Laptop Computer (APLC).  Based upon the data entered into the APLC, there was 
confusion as to the stopping distance of the aircraft, which prompted the Captain to touch 
down early and stop the aircraft abruptly.  The aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire, 
and the five occupants received minor injuries.  NTSB (2000) cited one of the causes of 
the accident to be, “the flight crew’s calculation error in determining the runway length 
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required for landing influenced the captain’s subsequent actions during final approach 
and landing by creating a sense of urgency to touch down early and initiate maximum 
braking immediately” (p. 60).  NTSB (2000) also states, "the Safety Board is concerned 
that two pilots with significant APLC experience at FedEx failed to properly interpret the 
calculated landing distances and that other experienced flight crews may also be deficient 
in their operational knowledge of how APLC systems function" (p. 60). 
 NASA is also receiving more incident reports through the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) concerning EFBs.  “The day of the paperless cockpit has 
dawned, and with that, ASRS is hearing more about incidents involving Electronic Flight 
Bags (EFBs), as these electronic displays are known" (“Paperless”, 2010, p. 1).   
 A 2014 report by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center looked at 
various reports from March 1994 to January 2014 for the keywords of EFB and PED.  
These reports included: ASRS reports, FAA runway incursion reports, FAA 
accident/incident reports, NTSB reports, CAA reports, ATSB reports, TSB reports, and 
French BEA reports.  The investigation revealed over 5,000 such reports that matched 
EFB and PED (DOT, 2014).   
 Thomas Haueter, the former director of aviation safety at the NTSB, predicts, 
“Incidents of this nature are a harbinger of what is to come”  (Traufetter, 2009, p. 4).  He 
also states, “Lots of people are very concerned that previously unknown problems could 
arise from the overabundance of computers and software.”  He wants to makes sure that 
pilots never lose complete control over their aircraft. (Traufetter, 2009, p. 4).  “The days 
are long gone when a pilot fully understood his aircraft.  We have to make a huge effort 
so that we don’t experience a decline in aviation safety”  (Traufetter, 2009, p. 4). 
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 In summary to the Electronic Flight Bag in the flight deck at airlines, Carr (2013) 
sums it up best: 
The experience of airlines should give us pause. It reveals that automation, for all 
its benefits, can take a toll on the performance and talents of those who rely on it. 
The implications go well beyond safety. Because automation alters how we act, 
how we learn, and what we know, it has an ethical dimension. The choices we 
make, or fail to make, about which tasks we hand off to machines shape our lives 
and the place we make for ourselves in the world. That has always been true, but 
in recent years, as the locus of labor-saving technology has shifted from 
machinery to software, automation has become ever more pervasive, even as its 
workings have become more hidden from us. Seeking convenience, speed, and 
efficiency, we rush to off-load work to computers without reflecting on what we 
might be sacrificing as a result (p. 3). 
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DEFINITIONS 
• Advisory Circular - a publication offered by the Federal Aviation Administration 
to provide guidance for compliance with airworthiness regulations 
• Automation Bias - the action of a human operator to favor guidance from an 
automated device and ignore guidance from a non-automated device, even if the 
latter is the correct action 
• Automation Complacency - the action of a pilot relying exclusively on 
automation and failing to monitor the automation 
• Brightness – EFB screen back-lighting intensity 
• Dimness – low intensity of EFB back-lighting 
• Glare – sunlight or artificial light reflecting on the EFB display 
• Paging - the action of swiping one or more fingers across the screen of the EFB to 
advance to another page 
• Pinching - the action of spreading two or more fingers apart or bringing them 
together on the screen of an EFB to either zoom in or out 
• Scrolling - a touching action on the screen of the EFB that allows for moving the 
display data up, down, left, or right. 
• Zooming - the action of pinching two or more fingers on the screen of the EFB to 




 Airline pilots face multiple human factors in modern, automated flight decks.  The 
widespread implementation of Electronic Flight Bags (EFB) at airlines beginning in 2010 
increased the potential for human error concerning automation complacency, bias, 
distraction, reliability and trust.  There have been multiple studies concerning Electronic 
Flight Bags since their initial inception in the early 1990s.  Review of literature did not 
discover a study to ascertain the effects on pilots and their perception of Electronic Flight 
Bags at airlines in a highly automated and regulated environment.  The study focuses on 
the perception of airline pilots in regards to Electronic Flight Bag utilization on the flight 
deck at Part 121 air carriers in the United States.  The study ascertains pilot views on the 
EFB as a distraction while being used during flight operations in addition to their 
perceived workload while interfacing with the devices.  The study then looks at 
demographic variations between the respondent perception with respect to primary flight 
instruction, rank, total flight time, age, corrective lenses, and education level.  In 
conclusion, the study will determine pros and cons that pilots experience while using an 
EFB.   
Population 
 The population group in the study involves airline pilots certified by 14 CFR Part 
121 (Part 121) that utilize Electronic Flight Bags on the flight deck during flight 
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operations.  The study encompasses all types of airlines operating under Part 121 
regardless of size or classification, for example, regional, national, major, cargo, legacy, 
etc.  All pilots of aircraft under Part 121 were included in the study regardless or crew 
complement; therefore, the study includes single-pilot operations under Part 121.  Single-
pilot operations under Part 121 rely on only one pilot to aviate, navigate, monitor aircraft 
systems, as well as interface with an Electronic Flight Bag if one is in use.  As such, the 
burden placed upon the pilot is greater than a multi-pilot flight deck. 
 Pilots operating under Part 121 are highly regulated for their training processes 
and operating procedures.  Many of the flight deck environments are highly automated, 
and there is specific training and procedures for operating in such an environment.  In 
addition to Electronic Flight Bags, pilots may utilize other automation in the flight deck 
such as autopilots, Flight Management Systems, navigation displays, enhanced ground 
proximity warning systems (EGPWS), head-up guidance systems (HGS), and traffic 
collision avoidance systems (TCAS). Part 121 carriers are trained and authorized to 
operate in a variety of weather conditions including visual meteorological conditions 
(VMC) and instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).  Under IMC, carriers are further 
authorized to conduct Category I instrument approaches, and some are authorized for 
Category II and III instrument approach procedures.  The latter two require additional 
training, regulation, and automation because of lower minimums on the approaches being 
conducted. 
 Pilots operating under 14 CFR Parts 91 and 135 were excluded from this study.  
While training and operations are more regulated under Part 135 as opposed to Part 91, 
there is no uniformity of training and procedures under these operations.  These pilots 
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also fly a wider variety of aircraft and may not have the demands placed upon them as 
airline pilots under Part 121.  
Data Sources and Collection 
 The study surveyed Part 121 airline pilots operating in the United States that are 
actively employed and utilizing an Electronic Flight Bag during flight operations.  There 
was no compensation to participants for completing the survey.  Any pilot participating in 
the survey did so voluntarily.  To protect the anonymity of the participants, the survey 
was completed via the Internet and was available from any computer with Internet access.  
There was no time limit to complete the survey.   The Internet survey also allowed 
respondents to complete the survey at their convenience. 
 The first two questions of the survey determined the status of the participant.  If 
the participant answered that they were not employed as a pilot at a Part 121 airline or 
utilizing an Electronic Flight Bag in flight operations, the survey ended, and no further 
data was collected. 
 Participants were recruited by various methods.  First, an email was sent to 
members of a professional pilot organization. (see Appendix A).  Second, an email was 
sent from labor organizations at multiple airlines to its members asking for participation. 
(see Appendix B).  The email contained a description of the study as well as the Internet 
link to complete the survey.  The two aforementioned groups also posted a link to the 
survey on their social media website. 
 When navigating to the Internet survey, participants once again were presented 
with a description of the study and instructions on completing the survey.  (see Appendix 
C).  The survey was available for four weeks. 
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 The survey contained both quantitative and qualitative questions.  (see Appendix 
D).  There were 27 questions that focused on several areas in relation to the Electronic 
Flight Bag:  flight information, demographics, EFB training, EFB distraction, EFB trust, 
EFB personal activities, and narrative questions for both positive and negative aspects of 
the EFB. 
 Once a participant completed the Internet survey, it was saved online.  After the 
survey closed, the results were imported into Microsoft Excel software for analysis.  
Quantitative data was imported into IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) for analysis.  Significant values were set at 0.05 alpha level (two-tailed).  
Qualitative data was read through by the researcher to detect themes that emerged from 
the data.  Once themes were identified, they were coded and classified into categories that 
were then reported. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
 It is assumed that pilots responding to the survey are current pilots at Part 121 air 
carriers in the United States.  AC 120-76C requires operators to train pilots on the EFB 
prior to use; therefore, it is also assumed that the pilots have been trained by their 
respective air carriers concerning normal and abnormal procedures relating to the 
Electronic Flight Bag, and that the EFB is being utilized in flight operations on the flight 
deck. 
 It will be difficult to measure events occurring in relation to the EFB since pilots 
are not counting each event as it occurs (quantitative).  The questions will pose a range of 
percentages and rely on the pilot to recount an estimation of a certain event occurring in 
regard to the EFB since there is no quantifiable method for the purpose of this study.  It 
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will also be difficult to ascertain whether pilots responding are being truthful in their 
responses based upon their perceptions.  Some of the possible reasons for this could 
possibly be related to employment or government retaliation for actions while on the 
flight deck. 
Protection of Human Subjects 
 The online survey that the participants completed received approval from the 
Institutional Review Board of the University of North Dakota.  In order to protect the 
participant’s identities, no personal information was gathered from the survey.  
 All participants voluntarily completed the online survey and follow-up study.  
This was conveyed at the beginning of the survey before beginning any questioning.  The 
participants were notified that they should only answer questions that they felt 
comfortable with and could terminate the survey at any time.   
 If the participants felt uncomfortable with any questioning, they were directed to 
the researcher at efbstudy@gmail.com or the University of North Dakota Institutional 





 There were 565 total participants that completed the survey (N = 565).  Results 
that were removed from the analysis are outlined in Table 6.  After removal of 
participants that did not meet the criteria, there remained 470 valid responses that were 
included in the study (N = 470).   
 
Table 6  
Respondent Removal from Study 
 





The entire record contained no data. 
 
38 Respondents that indicated in Question 1 that they were not 
a pilot at a Part 121 air carrier. 
 
5 The data contained no response in Question 2 pertaining to 
use of an EFB. 
 
32 The respondents indicated in Question 2 that they did not 
use an EFB on the flight deck. 
 
7 Questions 1 and 2 indicated that the respondent was a pilot 
for a Part 121 air carrier and used an EFB but did not 
provide any other data. 
 
7 No demographic information was provided 
95 TOTAL REMOVALS 
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A series of demographics questions were asked of the participants that included age, 
current rank at the airline, flight time, initial type of training, corrective lens usage, 
highest level of education completed, and length of EFB use.   
Age 
 The age demographic was broken down into ranges of:  younger than 20, 20-29, 
30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-64.  The Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007 
requires mandatory retirement for Part 121 pilots at age 65; therefore, the maximum age 
limit in the survey was 64.  Figure 1 details a histogram of respondent ages (N = 470). 
Figure 1  





 Pilots were asked to provide their current rank at their carrier.  The options 
presented were Captain, First Officer and Flight Engineer.  Zero respondents indicated 
the rank of Flight Engineer.  Figure 2 details the respondents rank as Captain and First 
Officer (n = 470). 
 
Figure 2  




Flight Time Experience 
 Respondents were asked to provide their approximate flight time and was then 
coded into the following ranges: 1,001 to 5,000, 5,001 to 10,000; 10,001 to 15,000; 
15,001 to 20,000; and greater than 20,000.  The minimum answer provided was 1,150 
hours, and the maximum was 34,000 hours.  Figure 3 details the flight time categories of 
the pilot respondents (N = 440). 
Figure 3  
Histogram of Flight Time 
 
Initial Flight Training  
 Pilots were asked to provide the type of initial training they received.  The options 
presented in the survey were:  Military, Part 61 flight school, Part 141 flight school, 
Other, and Other Explanation.  Three of the Other answers were coded to Part 61 flight 
school with the Other Explanation listed as:  "Independent flight instructors", "local 
FBO", and "private lessons with CFI".  Two of the Other responses were "UND" and 
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"Embry Riddle" and were coded as Part 141 flight school.  One Other response was 
detailed as "121 airline" and was omitted from analysis since pilots do not receive initial 
flight training from Part 121 airlines.  All additional responses of Other that are detailed 
contained no additional information from the respondent.  A majority of pilots indicated 
only one type of initial training; however, some indicated more than one type of initial 
training.  The reason for multiple answers are attributed to pilots completing one rating in 
one category and complete other ratings in another category.  For example, a pilot could 
receive Private Pilot training at a Part 61 school and then continue further ratings in the 
Military.  The responses are detailed in Figure 4 (N = 415).    
Figure 4  





 A question was presented to respondents to determine their corrective lens use 
while working on the flight deck.  The purpose was to determine if there was a 
correlation between corrective lens use and pilot perceptions.  Figure 5 shows the 
breakdown of corrective lens utilization on the flight deck (N = 470). 
 
Figure 5  




Highest Education Level Completed 
 Pilots were asked to provide their highest education level completed.  The options 
presented were high school, associate’s degree (2 year), bachelor’s degree (4 year), and 
post-bachelor’s degree.  2 respondents did not provide a response and are not included in 
the analysis (N = 468).  Figure 6 shows the histogram of pilot answers (N = 468). 
 
Figure 6  





Length of EFB Use 
 Respondents were also asked to provide the length of time that they have been 
using an EFB on the flight deck.  Upon analysis, responses were coded into three 
categories:  less than one year, one to two years, and more than two years.  The following 
histogram details the responses: 
 
Figure 7  




Types of EFB 
 Participants were also asked which type(s) of EFB that are utilized on the flight 
deck.  The options presented to the participants were: Apple iPad, Microsoft Surface 
Tablet, Onboard Performance Computer (OPC), Airport Performance Laptop Computer 
(APLC), and Other with a detailed explanation of Other. Table 7 details the responses 
from the pilots (N = 470).   
Table 7  
Type of EFB Used 
EFB TYPE Utilization % 
Apple iPad 419 89.15 
Microsoft Surface 39 8.30 
APLC 30 6.38 
OPC 91 19.36 
Other 34 7.23 
 
There were 34 responses of Other of which 17 presented detailed answers.  2 of the 17 
were omitted yielding 15 valid responses because of the provided answers of "Tablet 
?????" and "Jeppesen Flight Deck Pro" which is a charting software program utilized on 
an EFB, not the hardware device.   The valid Other details are displayed in Table 8.   
			 40	
Table 8  
Type of EFB Used - Other Responses 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
Android 1 
EFB installed by Boeing 1 




Panasonic Tough Tablet 1 
Panasonic Windows EFB 1 
Samsung Galaxy Android 1 
Samsung Tablet 1 
Installed in the aircraft 2 
Windows Tablet (not Surface) 1 
Total 15 
 
Type of EFB Utilization 
 Participants provided the types of tasks that are performed using an EFB on the 
flight deck.  The options available for selection were: Charts (SID, STAR, Approach, 
Enroute, etc.), Company Related Manuals (FOM, AOM, Training, etc.), Performance, 
Weight and Balance, and Other with an Explanation.  There were 330 valid responses 
provided and 24 Other responses.  Two Other responses of “De-ice chart” and “MEL” 
were categorized under Company Manuals.  One Other response of “Specific foreign 
airport familiarization” was coded under “Charts.”  Table 9 details the responses (N = 
470).  Other responses are detailed in Table 10. 
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Table 9  
EFB Utilization Applications 
EFB Utilization Utilization % 
Charts 468 99.57 
Company Manuals 459 97.66 
Performance 135 28.72 
Weight and Balance 46 9.79 
Other 33 7.02 
 
Table 10  
EFB Application Utilization - Other Responses 
RESPONSE FREQUENCY 
AIM 1 
Company email 1 
Recurrent training 1 





 If a respondent indicated that an Apple iPad or Microsoft Surface Tablet was used 
on the flight deck, the participant was further asked if there was prior experience with an 
iPad or Surface Table prior to using one as an EFB.  450 responses were given (N = 450) 
with 19 non-responses.  Figure 8 presents the responses. 
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Figure 8  




 Pilots were asked if they believed that the use of an EFB on the flight deck adds 
to their workload. The answer options to the question were Yes and No.  470 pilots 
provided valid responses (N = 470).  Figure 9 details the workload perception responses.  
Table 11 details the demographics with pilot perception. 
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Table 11  
EFB Workload Perception by Demographic Category 
Do you believe that the use of an EFB on the flight deck adds to your workload? 
Primary Flight Instruction* Yes % No % Total 
Military 17 9.83% 156 90.17% 173 
Part 61 8 9.88% 73 90.12% 81 
Part 141 19 12.10% 138 87.90% 157 
      
Rank Yes % No % Total 
Captain 29 14.29% 174 85.71% 203 
First Officer 26 9.74% 241 90.26% 267 
      
Flight Time Yes % No % Total 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 4 9.76% 37 90.24% 41 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 18 11.61% 137 88.39% 155 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 19 12.03% 139 87.97% 158 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 5 8.20% 56 91.80% 61 
More than 20,000 hours 5 20.00% 20 80.00% 25 
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Table 11. EFB Workload Perception by Demographic Category (continued) 
Age Yes % No % Total 
20-29 2 13.33% 13 86.67% 15 
30-39 7 8.75% 73 91.25% 80 
40-49 14 8.75% 146 91.25% 160 
50-59 27 15.61% 146 84.39% 173 
60-64 5 11.90% 37 88.10% 42 
      
Corrective Lenses Yes % No % Total 
Yes 37 13.41% 239 86.59% 276 
No 18 9.28% 176 90.72% 194 
      
Education Yes % No % Total 
High School 1 8.33% 11 91.67% 12 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 5 21.74% 18 78.26% 23 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 34 10.63% 286 89.38% 320 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 14 12.39% 99 87.61% 113 
      
EFB Type** Yes % No % Total 
iPad 33 11.38% 257 88.62% 290 
Surface 5 15.15% 28 84.85% 33 
APLC 0 0.00% 3 100.00% 3 
OPC 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 1 
iPad and APLC 5 23.81% 16 76.19% 21 
iPad and OPC 10 11.90% 74 88.10% 84 
      
Prior iPad or Surface Experience Yes % No % Total 
Yes 32 10.56% 271 89.44% 303 
No 23 15.65% 124 84.35% 147 
      
EFB Length of Use Yes % No % Total 
Less Than One Year 5 9.80% 46 90.20% 51 
1 - 2 Years 28 12.44% 197 87.56% 225 
More Than Two Years 22 12.15% 159 87.85% 181 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were outliers that were 
not reported. 
** Combinations of other EFB Types that are not listed were not reported due to them being outliers in the data. 
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Distraction 
 The survey asked participants if they believe that the EFB is a distraction to their 
normal flight deck duties.  470 pilots responded (N = 470).  The answer option were Yes 
and No.  Figure 10 details pilot perception toward the EFB as a distraction.  Table 12 
shows distraction perception crossed with the demographics. 
Figure 10  
Distraction Perception 
 
Table 12  
EFB Distraction Perception by Demographic Category 
Do you believe that the EFB is a distraction to your normal flight deck duties? 
Primary Flight Instruction* Yes % No % Total 
Military 7 4.05% 166 95.95% 173 
Part 61 5 6.17% 76 93.83% 81 
Part 141 12 7.64% 145 92.36% 157 
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Table 12. EFB Distraction by Demographic Category (continued) 
Rank Yes % No % Total 
Captain 14 6.90% 189 93.10% 203 
First Officer 13 4.87% 254 95.13% 267 
      
Flight Time Yes % No % Total 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 0 0.00% 41 100.00% 41 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 7 4.52% 148 95.48% 155 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 11 6.96% 147 93.04% 158 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 4 6.56% 57 93.44% 61 
More than 20,000 hours 3 12.00% 22 88.00% 25 
      
Age Yes % No % Total 
20-29 0 0.00% 15 100.00% 15 
30-39 3 3.75% 77 96.25% 80 
40-49 9 5.63% 151 94.38% 160 
50-59 11 6.36% 162 93.64% 173 
60-64 4 9.52% 38 90.48% 42 
      
Corrective Lenses Yes % No % Total 
Yes 17 6.16% 259 93.84% 276 
No 10 5.15% 184 94.85% 194 
      
Education Yes % No % Total 
High School 1 8.33% 11 91.67% 12 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 2 8.70% 21 91.30% 23 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 21 6.56% 299 93.44% 320 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 3 2.65% 110 97.35% 113 
      
EFB Type** Yes % No % Total 
iPad 16 5.52% 274 94.48% 290 
Surface 2 6.06% 31 93.94% 33 
APLC 0 0.00% 3 100.00% 3 
OPC 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 1 
iPad and APLC 2 9.52% 19 90.48% 21 
iPad and OPC 5 5.95% 79 94.05% 84 
      
      
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
Yes % No % Total 
Yes 12 3.96% 291 96.04% 303 
No 14 9.52% 133 90.48% 147 
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Table 12. EFB Distraction by Demographic Category (continued) 
EFB Length of Use Yes % No % Total 
Less Than One Year 2 3.92% 49 96.08% 51 
1 - 2 Years 14 6.22% 211 93.78% 225 
More Than Two Years 11 6.08% 170 93.92% 181 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were outliers that were 
not reported. 
** Combinations of other EFB Types that are not listed were not reported due to them being outliers in the data. 
      
Information Overload 
 Pilots were asked if the EFB gives them a sensation of information overload.  The 
answer options were Yes and No.  470 pilots responded to the question with 5 pilots 
opting not to answer (N = 470).  Figure 11 details the responses in relation to information 
overload.  Table 13 details information overload perception in relation to demographics. 
Figure 11  





Table 13  
EFB Information Overload Perception by Demographic Category 
Do you feel that the EFB gives you a sensation of information overload? 
Primary Flight Instruction* Yes % No % Total 
Military 16 9.30% 156 90.70% 172 
Part 61 4 4.94% 77 95.06% 81 
Part 141 11 7.01% 146 92.99% 157 
      
Rank Yes % No % Total 
Captain 18 8.91% 184 91.09% 202 
First Officer 17 6.37% 250 93.63% 267 
      
Flight Time Yes % No % Total 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 1 2.44% 40 97.56% 41 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 7 4.52% 148 95.48% 155 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 16 10.19% 141 89.81% 157 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 7 11.48% 54 88.52% 61 
More than 20,000 hours 3 12.00% 22 88.00% 25 
      
Age Yes % No % Total 
20-29 0 0.00% 15 100.00% 15 
30-39 4 5.00% 76 95.00% 80 
40-49 8 5.00% 152 95.00% 160 
50-59 23 13.37% 149 86.63% 172 
60-64 0 0.00% 42 100.00% 42 
      
Corrective Lenses Yes % No % Total 
Yes 25 9.06% 251 90.94% 276 
No 10 5.18% 183 94.82% 193 
      
Education Yes % No % Total 
High School 2 16.67% 10 83.33% 12 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 4 17.39% 19 82.61% 23 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 18 5.63% 302 94.38% 320 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 11 9.82% 101 90.18% 112 
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Table 13. EFB Information Overload Perception by Demographic Category (continued) 
EFB Type** Yes % No % Total 
iPad 25 8.65% 264 91.35% 289 
Surface 1 3.03% 32 96.97% 33 
APLC 0 0.00% 3 100.00% 3 
OPC 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 1 
iPad and APLC 1 4.76% 20 95.24% 21 
iPad and OPC 7 8.33% 77 91.67% 84 
      
      
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
Yes % No % Total 
Yes 20 6.62% 282 93.38% 302 
No 15 10.20% 132 89.80% 147 
      
EFB Length of Use Yes % No % Total 
Less Than One Year 6 11.76% 45 88.24% 51 
1 - 2 Years 18 8.04% 206 91.96% 224 
More Than Two Years 11 6.08% 170 93.92% 181 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were outliers that were 
not reported. 
** Combinations of other EFB Types that are not listed were not reported due to them being outliers in the data. 
 
Difficulty In Navigating The EFB 
 Pilots were asked if the believe that they have difficulty navigating the EFB, for 
example, switching between applications or finding information that is needed.  Again, 
the question has possible answer choices of Yes and No.  470 pilots responded with 4 
opting not to answer the question (N = 470).  Figure 12 details the responses in relation to 
pilot perception of difficulty navigating the EFB.  Table 14 details perception of 
difficulty in navigating the EFB crossed with the demographics. 
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Figure 12  
Perception of EFB Navigation Difficulty 
 
Table 14  
EFB Navigation Difficulty by Demographic Category 
Do you have difficulty navigating the EFB, for example, switching between 
applications or finding information that you need? 
Primary Flight Instruction* Yes % No % Total 
Military 40 23.12% 133 76.88% 173 
Part 61 24 29.63% 57 70.37% 81 
Part 141 35 22.29% 122 77.71% 157 
      
Rank Yes % No % Total 
Captain 63 31.03% 140 68.97% 203 
First Officer 53 19.85% 214 80.15% 267 
      
Flight Time Yes % No % Total 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 3 7.32% 38 92.68% 41 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 26 16.77% 129 83.23% 155 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 39 24.68% 119 75.32% 158 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 20 32.79% 41 67.21% 61 
More than 20,000 hours 13 52.00% 12 48.00% 25 
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Table 14. EFB Navigation Difficulty by Demographic Category (continued) 
Age Yes % No % Total 
20-29 2 13.33% 13 86.67% 15 
30-39 8 10.00% 72 90.00% 80 
40-49 38 23.75% 122 76.25% 160 
50-59 54 31.21% 119 68.79% 173 
60-64 14 33.33% 28 66.67% 42 
      
Corrective Lenses Yes % No % Total 
Yes 78 28.26% 198 71.74% 276 
No 38 19.59% 156 80.41% 194 
      
Education Yes % No % Total 
High School 6 50.00% 6 50.00% 12 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 8 34.78% 15 65.22% 23 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 79 24.69% 241 75.31% 320 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 23 20.35% 90 79.65% 113 
      
EFB Type** Yes % No % Total 
iPad 72 24.83% 218 75.17% 290 
Surface 9 27.27% 24 72.73% 33 
APLC 0 0.00% 3 100.00% 3 
OPC 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 1 
iPad and APLC 7 33.33% 14 66.67% 21 
iPad and OPC 21 25.00% 63 75.00% 84 
      
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
Yes % No % Total 
Yes 67 22.11% 236 77.89% 303 
No 46 31.29% 101 68.71% 147 
      
EFB Length of Use Yes % No % Total 
Less Than One Year 17 33.33% 34 66.67% 51 
1 - 2 Years 59 26.22% 166 73.78% 225 
More Than Two Years 39 21.55% 142 78.45% 181 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were outliers that were 
not reported. 
** Combinations of other EFB Types that are not listed were not reported due to them being outliers in the data. 
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Initial EFB Training 
Participants were asked their perception of their initial EFB training to be proficient in 
normal flight operations (N = 469).  A Likert scale was used to ascertain pilot perception 
of initial EFB training with responses ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly 
Agree.”  Figure 13 details pilot responses.  Table 15 breaks down these results based on 
demographics. 
Figure 13 
Initial Training Proficiency - Normal Operations 
 
 
Table 15  
EFB Initial Training (Normal) Perception by Demographic Category 
Do you feel that your initial Electronic Flight Bag training was adequate to be 
proficient in normal flight operations? 
Primary Flight Instruction* SD D Neither A SA 
Military 16 44 27 75 11 
Part 61 10 24 14 23 10 
Part 141 15 34 20 71 17 
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Table 15. EFB Initial Training (Normal) Perception by Demographic Category 
(continued) 
Rank SD D Neither A SA 
Captain 27 52 33 75 15 
First Officer 22 63 37 120 25 
      
Flight Time SD D Neither A SA 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 1 6 8 20 6 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 10 47 20 65 13 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 20 37 24 65 12 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 10 10 9 23 8 
More than 20,000 hours 3 6 5 10 1 
      
Age SD D Neither A SA 
20-29 0 2 2 10 1 
30-39 5 12 14 35 14 
40-49 15 45 15 74 11 
50-59 21 45 30 67 9 
60-64 8 11 9 9 5 
      
Corrective Lenses SD D Neither A SA 
Yes 38 66 40 111 20 
No 11 49 30 84 20 
      
Education SD D Neither A SA 
High School 2 5 1 4 0 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 2 8 7 5 1 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 34 77 49 131 28 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 11 24 12 55 11 
      
EFB Type** SD D Neither A SA 
iPad 24 69 48 122 26 
Surface 2 7 6 15 3 
APLC 0 1 0 2 0 
OPC 0 0 0 1 0 
iPad and APLC 6 4 4 7 0 
iPad and OPC 13 20 11 34 6 
      
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
SD D Neither A SA 
Yes 29 64 47 133 30 
No 17 44 21 55 9 
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Table 15. EFB Initial Training (Normal) Perception by Demographic Category 
(continued) 
EFB Length of Use SD D Neither A SA 
Less Than One Year 6 11 14 18 2 
1 - 2 Years 19 55 25 105 20 
More Than Two Years 23 46 27 68 17 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were outliers that were 
not reported. 
** Combinations of other EFB Types that are not listed were not reported due to them being outliers in the data. 
 
 
Continuing on the subject of initial training, pilots were asked their perception of initial 
EFB training in regards to failure or malfunction of the EFB (N = 468).  Figure 14 
highlights the responses.  A Likert scale was also used to determine pilot perception 
concerning their initial training ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.  
Figure 14 details the responses.  Table 16 highlights the responses with the 
demographics. 
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Figure 14  
Initial Training Proficiency - Failure or Malfunction 
 
Table 16  
EFB Initial Training (Malfunction) Perception by Demographic Category 
Do you feel that your initial Electronic Flight Bag training was adequate to prepare 
you for malfunctions or failures? 
Primary Flight Instruction* SD D Neither A SA 
Military 22 61 46 38 6 
Part 61 11 28 19 16 6 
Part 141 20 37 54 37 8 
      
Rank SD D Neither A SA 
Captain 33 66 61 35 7 
First Officer 28 74 80 70 14 
      
Flight Time SD D Neither A SA 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 1 11 15 10 4 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 19 49 42 37 7 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 21 43 52 37 5 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 10 24 11 11 4 
More than 20,000 hours 3 5 10 6 1 
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Table 16. EFB Initial Training (Malfunction) Perception by Demographic Category 
(continued) 
Age SD D Neither A SA 
20-29 0 4 5 6 0 
30-39 5 20 27 19 9 
40-49 21 51 48 34 6 
50-59 26 53 48 40 4 
60-64 9 12 13 6 2 
      
Corrective Lenses SD D Neither A SA 
Yes 41 75 84 65 9 
No 20 65 57 40 12 
      
Education SD D Neither A SA 
High School 3 3 5 1 0 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 3 8 8 3 1 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 41 89 98 74 16 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 14 39 29 27 4 
      
EFB Type** SD D Neither A SA 
iPad 30 95 91 60 12 
Surface 4 7 13 7 2 
APLC 0 2 0 1 0 
OPC 0 0 0 1 0 
iPad and APLC 7 2 4 8 0 
iPad and OPC 12 26 22 19 5 
      
      
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
SD D Neither A SA 
Yes 39 83 92 69 18 
No 19 52 42 31 3 
      
EFB Length of Use SD D Neither A SA 
Less Than One Year 6 19 15 11 0 
1 - 2 Years 24 72 73 46 8 
More Than Two Years 30 44 49 45 13 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were 
outliers that were not reported. 
** Combinations of other EFB Types that are not listed were not reported due to them being outliers 




Failure Or Malfunction 
 
 Respondents were also asked about their experience with EFB failures and 
malfunctions.  Since this is not a total count of events, it is drawing upon pilots’ 
memories of the approximate percentages of such experiences (N = 469).  Table 17 
details pilot responses in relation to failure or malfunction of the EFB.  Table 18 displays 
the perception crossed with demographics. 
Table 17  






1% - 24% 
 
25% - 49% 
 
50% - 74% 
Greater than 
75% 
469 268 191 8 2 0 
 
Table 18  
EFB Malfunction/Failure Experience by Demographic Category 
In your experience, at what frequency has the Electronic Flight Bag failed or 
malfunctioned? 
Primary Flight Instruction* Never 1-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Military 102 71 0 0 0 
Part 61 47 34 0 0 0 
Part 141 86 65 5 1 0 
      
Rank Never 1-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Captain 123 75 2 2 0 
First Officer 145 116 6 0 0 
      
Flight Time Never 1-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 25 16 0 0 0 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 81 71 3 0 0 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 97 54 5 2 0 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 35 25 0 0 0 
More than 20,000 hours 13 12 0 0 0 
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Table 18. EFB Malfunction/Failure Experience by Demographic Category (continued) 
Age Never 1-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
20-29 12 3 0 0 0 
30-39 47 32 1 0 0 
40-49 79 74 6 1 0 
50-59 107 63 1 1 0 
60-64 23 19 0 0 0 
      
Corrective Lenses Never 1-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Yes 158 112 4 1 0 
No 110 79 4 1 0 
      
Education Never 1-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
High School 7 5 0 0 0 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 15 8 0 0 0 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 179 132 7 1 0 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 67 44 1 1 0 
      
EFB Type** Never 1-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
iPad 191 94 2 2 0 
Surface 7 22 4 0 0 
APLC 0 3 0 0 0 
OPC 0 1 0 0 0 
iPad and APLC 2 18 1 0 0 
iPad and OPC 60 23 1 0 0 
      
      
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
Never 1-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Yes 178 117 5 2 0 
No 86 58 3 0 0 
      
EFB Length of Use Never 1-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Less Than One Year 30 20 1 0 0 
1 - 2 Years 153 69 2 1 0 
More Than Two Years 80 94 5 1 0 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were 
outliers that were not reported. 
** Combinations of other EFB Types that are not listed were not reported due to them being outliers 
in the data. 
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Not Functioning As Expected 
 
 Pilots were asked if, in their experience, that the EFB did not function as the pilot 
expected.  This question also drew upon the pilot’s memory of approximate percentage or 
such events occurring, not an actual count.  Table 19 details the pilot responses, and 
Table 20 shows the perception grouped by demographic category. 
Table 19  





















469 159 261 30 5 2 12 
 
Table 20  
EFB Not Operating as Expected by Demographic Category 
What percentage of the time has the EFB operated in a manner that you were not expecting? 
Primary Flight Instruction* Always 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Military 48 110 10 0 0 0 
Part 61 31 42 7 0 0 0 
Part 141 63 78 10 2 1 0 
       
Rank Always 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Captain 70 107 15 1 2 7 
First Officer 89 154 15 4 0 5 
       
Flight Time Always 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 15 25 1 0 0 0 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 44 95 11 2 0 0 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 60 81 8 2 2 0 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 21 28 8 1 0 0 
More than 20,000 hours 10 14 0 0 0 0 
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Table 20. EFB Not Operating as Expected by Demographic Category (continued) 
Age Always 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
20-29 9 6 0 0 0 0 
30-39 29 41 8 1 0 1 
40-49 54 92 8 2 1 3 
50-59 58 94 11 2 1 6 
60-64 9 28 3 0 0 2 
       
Corrective Lenses Always 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Yes 90 157 18 3 2 5 
No 69 104 12 2 0 7 
       
Education Always 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
High School 6 5 1 0 0 0 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 11 9 0 2 0 0 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 115 171 22 3 2 0 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 27 76 6 0 0 0 
       
EFB Type** Always 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
iPad 109 150 16 3 1 0 
Surface 5 21 6 0 1 0 
APLC 0 2 1 0 0 0 
OPC 0 1 0 0 0 0 
iPad and APLC 2 16 1 1 0 0 
iPad and OPC 37 41 4 1 0 0 
       
       
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
Always 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Yes 109 163 19 4 1 7 
No 46 83 10 1 1 5 
       
EFB Length of Use Always 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Less Than One Year 16 30 3 2 0 0 
1 - 2 Years 96 108 10 2 1 0 
More Than Two Years 42 116 16 1 1 0 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were outliers that were 
not reported. 




Loss Of Situational Awareness 
 Pilots were asked if the EFB had been a cause for them to lose situational 
awareness while pilot the aircraft.   The answer responses were to draw upon the pilot’s 
approximate percentage of the situation occurring.  Table 21 details the pilot responses, 
and Table 22 yields the results crossed with the demographics. 
 
Table 21  





















470 375 88 4 3 0 0 
 
Table 22  
EFB Situational Awareness Experience by Demographic Category 
What percentage of time have you lost situation awareness in the flight deck due to the 
Electronic Flight Bag? 
Primary Flight Instruction* Never 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Military 137 34 1 1 0 0 
Part 61 65 15 1 0 0 0 
Part 141 126 29 0 2 0 0 
       
Rank Never 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Captain 161 40 1 1 0 0 
First Officer 214 48 3 2 0 0 
       
Flight Time Never 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 35 6 0 0 0 0 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 124 29 2 0 0 0 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 125 30 2 1 0 0 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 50 10 0 1 0 0 
More than 20,000 hours 17 7 0 1 0 0 
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Table 22. EFB Situational Awareness Experience by Demographic Category (continued) 
Age Never 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
20-29 14 1 0 0 0 0 
30-39 65 14 1 0 0 0 
40-49 123 33 3 1 0 0 
50-59 144 28 0 1 0 0 
60-64 29 12 0 1 0 0 
       
Corrective Lenses Never 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Yes 215 56 2 3 0 0 
No 160 32 2 0 0 0 
       
Education Never 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
High School 11 1 0 0 0 0 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 18 4 0 1 0 0 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 251 64 3 2 0 0 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 93 19 1 0 0 0 
       
EFB Type** Never 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
iPad 237 49 3 1 0 0 
Surface 28 5 0 0 0 0 
APLC 2 1 0 0 0 0 
OPC 1 0 0 0 0 0 
iPad and APLC 12 8 0 1 0 0 
iPad and OPC 70 13 0 1 0 0 
       
       
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
Never 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Yes 244 54 3 2 0 0 
No 114 31 1 1 0 0 
       
EFB Length of Use Never 1-9% 10-24% 25-49% 50-74% <75% 
Less Than One Year 42 8 0 1 0 0 
1 - 2 Years 182 40 2 1 0 0 
More Than Two Years 140 38 2 1 0 0 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were outliers that were 
not reported. 





 Pilots were asked if they believe that utilization of the EFB on the flight deck is 
safe.  The answer responses used a Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to 
“Strongly Agree”  Table 23 details the safety perception of pilots and Table 24 shows the 
results by demographic category. 
Table 23  



















470 10 5 19 137 299 
 
Table 24  
EFB Safety Perception by Demographic Category 
Do you feel that utilization of the Electronic Flight Bag on the flight deck is safe? 
Primary Flight Instruction* SD D Neither A SA 
Military 3 3 4 47 116 
Part 61 2 0 4 23 52 
Part 141 3 2 5 49 98 
      
Rank SD D Neither A SA 
Captain 6 4 9 64 120 
First Officer 4 1 10 73 179 
      
Flight Time SD D Neither A SA 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 0 0 1 7 33 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 6 1 7 45 96 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 1 1 5 43 108 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 2 1 3 17 38 
More than 20,000 hours 1 2 0 11 11 
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Table 24. EFB Safety Perception by Demographic Category (continued) 
 
Age 
SD D Neither A SA 
20-29 0 0 0 2 13 
30-39 1 2 4 17 56 
40-49 6 0 5 45 104 
50-59 3 1 7 60 102 
60-64 0 2 3 13 24 
      
Corrective Lenses SD D Neither A SA 
Yes 7 3 10 93 163 
No 3 2 9 44 136 
      
Education SD D Neither A SA 
High School 0 0 1 4 7 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 0 0 2 13 8 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 8 5 12 94 201 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 2 0 4 25 82 
      
EFB Type** SD D Neither A SA 
iPad 7 3 11 88 181 
Surface 1 2 0 13 17 
APLC 0 0 0 1 2 
OPC 0 0 0 0 1 
iPad and APLC 0 0 1 9 11 
iPad and OPC 1 0 4 18 61 
      
      
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
SD D Neither A SA 
Yes 9 5 9 81 199 
No 1 0 9 50 87 
      
EFB Length of Use SD D Neither A SA 
Less Than One Year 0 1 2 20 28 
1 - 2 Years 6 4 6 70 139 
More Than Two Years 4 0 10 43 124 
*   Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training selections and "Other" were outliers that were 
not reported. 




EFB vs. Paper 
 Pilot respondents were questioned on their preference of EFB, paper, or a 
combination of both while performing their duties in the flight deck.  Total respondents 
equaled 470 (N = 470).  Figure 15 details the responses, and Table 25 shows the 
responses by demographic category. 
 
Figure 15  




Table 25  
EFB vs. Paper Preference by Demographic Category 
If you had your choice in the flight deck, would you prefer to 
use an Electronic Flight Bag, paper or a combination of the 
two? 
Primary Flight Instruction* EFB Paper Combo 
Military 141 3 29 
Part 61 61 2 18 
Part 141 123 2 32 
    
Rank EFB Paper Combo 
Captain 156 2 45 
First Officer 215 6 46 
    
Flight Time EFB Paper Combo 
1,000 to 5,000 hours 37 0 4 
5,001 to 10,000 hours 126 2 27 
10,001 to 15,000 hours 122 4 32 
15,001 to 20,000 hours 48 0 13 
More than 20,000 hours 17 2 6 
    
Age EFB Paper Combo 
20-29 12 0 3 
30-39 64 2 14 
40-49 125 2 33 
50-59 138 3 32 
60-64 32 1 9 
    
Corrective Lenses EFB Paper Combo 
Yes 210 6 60 
No 161 2 31 
    
Education EFB Paper Combo 
High School 7 0 5 
Associate's Degree (2 year) 18 1 4 
Bachelor's Degree (4 year) 252 6 62 
Post-Bachelor's Degree 92 1 20 
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Table 25. EFB vs. Paper Preference by Demographic Category (continued) 
EFB Type** EFB Paper Combo 
iPad 229 5 56 
Surface 22 1 10 
APLC 2 0 1 
OPC 1 0 0 
iPad and APLC 17 0 4 
iPad and OPC 69 2 13 
    
    
Prior iPad or Surface 
Experience 
EFB Paper Combo 
Yes 246 5 52 
No 109 3 35 
    
EFB Length of Use EFB Paper Combo 
Less Than One Year 36 1 14 
1 - 2 Years 176 7 42 
More Than Two Years 148 0 33 
*Only military, Part 61, and Part 141 are listed.  Multiple training 
selections and "Other" were outliers that were not reported. 
** Combinations of other EFB Types that are not listed were not reported 
due to them being outliers in the data. 
 
 
 Pilots that indicated a combination of both were further asked to detail their 
response.  Of the 91 pilots that answered a combination of EFB and paper, 71 provided a 
detailed response (N = 71).  The themes that emerged from the pilot responses preferring 
paper over the EFB included:  paper as a backup, checklists, company manuals, ease of 
use for paper, enroute charts, and speed considerations.   Some pilots indicated that 
their respective airlines have removed paper sources of charts and company manuals, and 
they would like to have the EFB as a tool; however, they would like to have paper 
backups in the flight deck in case of EFB failure.   
 Other pilots indicated a preference for checklists and emergency procedures, such 
as the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), being in paper format.  One pilot responded 
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that, “Checklists are more usable in paper format.”  Another pilot stated that, “Emergency 
procedures should remain paper.  Something to grab quickly and work your problem.  
Everything else can be electronic.”   
 Other pilots prefer the EFB for charts; however, want company manuals to be in 
paper format.  One pilot reinforced this by stating, “EFB for charts and performance.  
Paper manuals and airplane manuals to read and solve problems.”  Other pilots preferred 
company manuals in paper due to highlighting and note taking.  One pilots notes, “I 
prefer paper for company manuals.  It is easier (for me) to quickly find information, and I 
miss highlighting and being able to write pertinent notes in the margins.”  Another pilot 
would also light the permanence of highlighting company manuals by responding, “I like 
paper for things like FOM.  Can permanently high light them.” 
 Paper charts were a preference for their ease of use with some pilots indicating 
that, “There is only one interface with the efb. Not easy at times to navigate. The need to 
access more than one doc at a time. My company is cheap.”  Another respondent 
indicated that, “With Paper I can have multiple charts available....taxi + SID + Engine out 
all at once.” 
 Almost half of the respondents indicated that they prefer to have Enroute Charts 
available in paper format for their ease of finding pertinent information.  It was also 
indicated that the EFB software for enroute charts is very slow and crashes frequently.  
Responses included, “Enroute charts are still easier to read and contain more information 
than its electronic equivalent”,  “I like using paper copies of Enroute charts. The EFB is 
too slow and crashes too much to use them due to their large size,” and another pilot 
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agreeing by stating, “It is helpful for international flights to have paper hi/low charts. 
Easier to find ball notes, etc...” 
 Paper preference was noted as much faster than the EFB for certain flight tasks.  
One response said that it is, “currently quicker to find certain things with paper,” and 
another response echoed that by stating, “sometimes it’s faster to find the information 
needed with a paper product.”  Another pilot detailed further, “unable to keep notes or 
quick reference items with an EFB so looking up info that would be the flip of a page or 
two becomes a major slow down in accomplishing tasks,” and another stating, “when 
there are numerous details to reference during a short period of time, the EFB isn't always 
the best at allowing you to select exactly what you want to see and in what order to 
present it. For example, displaying the DP on the EFB during the takeoff roll might be 
considered SOP by some operators. But what about the after takeoff engine out procedure 
at a terrain critical airport? The EFB can't display both at the same time. But with the 
paper combination, I can clip the engine out chart to the yoke, the side window, or lay it 
on the shelf outboard of my seat. When the engine quits, I don't even have to touch the 
EFB, I can keep my hands on the thrust levers and the flight controls, and simply adjust 
my focus to the paper chart to establish the necessary flight path.” 
 
Relationships Between Demographics and Perception 
 To analyze the relationship between demographics and pilot perception of the 
EFB, a Pearson’s r was used.  Some of the data was collected using a Likert scale as was 
previously noted and also noted in the Notes section of each table; therefore, a positive r 
value indicates a decrease in frequency, and a negative r value indicates an increase in 
frequency.   
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Table 26  
Relationship Between Demographics and Workload Perception 
Do you believe that the use of an EFB on the flight deck 
adds to your workload? 
Airline Rank .070 
Initial Training Type -.065 
Flight Time -.025 
Age -.061 
Corrective Lenses .063 
Education .007 
EFB Usage Time -.014 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 440 to 470. *p < .05,  **p < .01 
 
Table 27  
Relationship Between Demographics and EFB Distraction 
Do you believe that the EFB is a distraction to your normal 
flight deck duties? 
Airline Rank .043 
Initial Training Type .009 
Flight Time -.099* 
Age -.072 
Corrective Lenses .021 
Education .072 
EFB Usage Time -.019 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 440 to 470. *P < .05,  **p < .01 
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Table 28  
Relationship Between Demographics and Information Overload 
Do you feel that the EFB give you a sense of information 
overload? 
Airline Rank .048 
Initial Training Type .017 
Flight Time -.117* 
Age -.068 
Corrective Lenses .073 
Education .025 
EFB Usage Time .063 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 439 to 469. *P < .05,  **p < .01 
 
Table 29  
Relationship Between Demographics and Navigation Difficulty 
Do you have difficulty navigating the EFB, for example, 
switching between applications or finding information that 
you need? 
Airline Rank .128** 
Initial Training Type .002 
Flight Time -.231** 
Age -.173** 
Corrective Lenses .099* 
Education .108* 
EFB Usage Time .083 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 440 to 470. *P < .05,  **p < .01 
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Table 30  
Relationship Between Demographics and Initial Training - Normal Ops 
Do you feel that your initial EFB training was adequate to 
be proficient in normal operations? 
Airline Rank .101* 
Initial Training Type .027 
Flight Time -.083 
Age -.184** 
Corrective Lenses .100* 
Education .110* 
EFB Usage Time -.018 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 439 to 469. *p < .05,  **p < .01; Likert scale 
 
Table 31  
Relationship Between Demographics and Initial Training - Abnormal Ops 
Do you feel that your initial EFB training was adequate to 
prepare you for malfunctions or failures? 
Airline Rank .133** 
Initial Training Type -.003 
Flight Time -.069 
Age -.149** 
Corrective Lenses .027 
Education .030 
EFB Usage Time .058 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 438 to 468. *p < .05,  **p < .01; Likert scale  
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Table 32  
Relationship Between Demographics and EFB Failure/Malfunction 
In your experience, at what frequency has the EFB failed or 
malfunctioned? 
Airline Rank .052 
Initial Training Type .045 
Flight Time -.009 
Age -.001 
Corrective Lenses .015 
Education .007 
EFB Usage Time -.163** 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 439 to 469. *p < .05,  **p < .01 
 
Table 33  
Relationship Between Demographics and EFB Not Operating As Expected 
What percentage of the time has the EFB operated in a 
manner you were not expecting? 
Airline Rank -.041 
Initial Training Type .055 
Flight Time .029 
Age .098* 
Corrective Lenses .009 
Education .068 
EFB Usage Time .090 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 439 to 469. *p < .05,  **p < .01 
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Table 34  
Relationship Between Demographics and Loss of Situational Awareness 
What percentage of the time have you lost situational 
awareness in the flight deck due to the EFB? 
Airline Rank .003 
Initial Training Type -.003 
Flight Time .077 
Age .047 
Corrective Lenses -.066 
Education -.020 
EFB Usage Time .033 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 440 to 470. *p < .05,  **p < .01 
 
Table 35  
Relationship Between Demographics and EFB Safety Perception 
Do you feel that utilization of the EFB on the flight deck is 
safe? 
Airline Rank .099* 
Initial Training Type -.024 
Flight Time -.089 
Age -.077 
Corrective Lenses .080 
Education .088 
EFB Usage Time .048 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 440 to 470. *p < .05,  **p < .01; Likert scale 
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Table 36  
Relationship Between Demographics and Paper Choice 
If you had your choice in the flight deck, would you prefer 
an EFB or paper? 
Airline Rank -.054 
Initial Training Type -.033 
Flight Time .090 
Age .010 
Corrective Lenses -.079 
Education -.065 
EFB Usage Time -.067 
Note: n varies with each demographic question with a range 
from 440 to 470. *p < .05,  **p < .01 
 
Pilot Likes of the EFB 
 When asked about what was liked about the EFB, 318 provided detailed 
information (N = 318).  Some pilots listed only one aspect that they liked while others 
detailed multiple.  The common themes that emerged from the responses indicated the 
following likes:  functionality aspects (highlighting, zooming, note taking), consolidation 
of resources, revision updating, convenience, efficiency, and lightweight.   
 In regards to the functionality aspect, one pilot notes that, "Can zoom in and 
highlight.  Can change pages quickly.  I also really like not having to turn on a map light 
to read the plates at night."  Another pilots agree that, “I like the ease of navigating my 
charts quickly, along with being able to make notes on the page easily, with only my 
finger.  Also, not being forced to carry a heavy, separate bag from my Jepps and 
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company publications is fantastic.”  Numerous pilots like the, “ability to zoom” and the 
“ability to enlarge charts.”   
 Another pilot summed up most of the prevalent themes about the EFB by stating, 
"All information needed for a flight is available in one location.  The EFB permits me to 
set up the flight in stages and create personalized pages with highlighting and notes 
where needed.  Extracting information for unplanned flight events (diversions, re-routes, 
etc.) is very easy and makes the transition smooth.  It permits me to focus more on 
piloting or monitoring without worrying about paper charts.  An added benefit is the 
elimination of carrying an additional (and heavy) chart case and the requirement to 
update chart sets."   Numerous other pilots indicated that, “all information is in one 
place”, “all information is at my fingertips”, and “all information is readily accessible.”  
One pilot responded, “all information up to speed (revision), quick easy access. Functions 
I would not have on paper (e.g. Search of fixes, airports, frequencies, fir boundary notes 
searchable, all company pubs searchable and on and on and on......)” 
 Pilots also indicated that they like the ease of updating, or in some cases auto-
updating, or revisions.  One pilot notes that, "Always having the most current revisions 
automatically downloaded."  Numerous pilots responded that the EFB is, “much easier to 
keep up to date.”   
 Respondents also like the convenience aspect of the EFB since most of them will 
be carrying a PED with them at work anyway.  One pilot notes, “Convenience of 
everything I need at my fingertips in a small, light-weight package (that I'm going to 
carry anyway).”  This convenience also allows pilots to carry multiple publications by 
noting, “Convenience. Ease of packing for trip and not having to lug around paper 
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books.”  One respondent believes that this convenience aspect is much safer by stating, 
“all manuals and charts in one handy location that I never have to go heads down in 
critical situations.” 
 Efficiency of the EFB was also a recurring theme of characteristics that pilots like 
about the EFB.  Various responses indicate, “ease, quick efficient availability of pubs and 
charts”, “much easier and less time consuming than paper charts. You can switch 
between the charts u [sic] need very quickly and efficiently”, “quick access to charts, not 
having to replace used charts” , “efficient in terms of cockpit time management”, and  
“the efficiency of accessing information is better than I ever imagined.  It is a completely 
new paradigm in accessing information.”  
 Respondents also indicated that they like the weight reduction from carrying 
manuals to a lightweight Electronic Flight Bag.  Various pilots noted that the EFB is, 
“very light to carry.”  One pilot indicated, “it does not take up as much room and much 
lighter” with other pilots agreeing by stating, “weight and space saving.” 
Pilot Dislikes of the EFB 
 Pilots were asked what they disliked about using the EFB on the flight deck.  
There were 408 respondents that provided feedback (N = 408).  Common themes that 
emerged concerning dislikes include:  FAA restrictions on usage, battery life, manual 
highlights and bookmarks are lost with revision updates, slow processing speed, limited 
search capabilities, mounting location, difficulty locating items, poor training, glare, 
freezing, and the ability to only view one page at a time. 
 Some pilots view the Federal Aviation Administration for holding back progress 
of the EFB with one pilot stating, “how the potential of the EFB is currently being limited 
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by the FAA.  Part 121 operations in general are being held back due to the lack of vision 
and ability for the FAA to adapt to the modern age.”  Another pilots states that the 
“problem is the FAA is slow in adopting the new platform.”   
 The lack of battery life for the EFB was another complaint from many pilots.  
“iPad battery could last longer”, “must have power source installed to maintain adequate 
battery life”, and “The battery life is lacking.  You cannot spend a lot of time enroute 
reviewing manuals, and have enough battery life for the entire day” were some of the 
sentiments echoed from some pilots.   
 Pilots report that as updates occur on the EFB, the highlights and bookmarks are 
frequently lost.    Pilot responses to this dislike include, “losing bookmarks and 
highlighting in the manuals portion. FOM, AOM, etc.”, “having to re-bookmark a 
publication after it is updated”, and “bookmarks and hi-lites [sic] tend to get lost or 
disappear.”  
 Pilots also note slow processing speed of the EFB.  Pilots commented, “slow 
operating system, our carrier purchased the cheapest”, “sometimes gets slow, maybe a 
little overwhelmed because I demand things faster than it can process them. This is a 
software/hardware issue, not a philosophical issue”, “sometimes runs a bit slow 
sometimes slow to switch modes or between charts”, and “having to use it to look up 
information in company pubs!  Takes too long.” 
   
 Search capabilities on the EFB are another dislike that emerged as a theme from 
pilot responses.  “Interface to navigate sources of directive information (FOM, AOM, 
etc.) is poor. It is hard to search for information.”  Another pilot notes that, “manual are 
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surprisingly difficult to search through, I prefer the electronic approach charts. However I 
strongly prefer printed AOM FOM etc.”  One pilots states that, “you must use exact 
verbiage to find stuff.  Search function is useless.”  While searching for information can 
be challenging, other pilots commented that it can be difficult navigating the EFB for 
information.  “Sometimes difficult to locate a particular manual or document”, “trying to 
find company reference material can be problematic based on how the company 
structures the file system and how often they change locations of a document within the 
file system”, and “you must study ahead of time to know what location your info you are 
seeking is in what area on the iPad.” 
 A source of distraction to pilots is the mounting feature of the Electronic Flight 
Bag.  “Mounting location on the side cockpit window.  Out of my normal scan and too 
close to my face.”  One other response indicated that, “mounting solution on window can 
fail”, and another indicated, “Mounting. Aircraft manufacturers should integrate them 
into flight deck design, ie. build a charging mount on the side window.” 
 Sunlight reflection, or glare, on the EFB was another common theme that pilots 
reported as a dislike.    “During day flights the screen can be hard to see due to glare” and 
“glare from the white shirt in some bright conditions and trying to use enroute charts.”  
Glare can also cause other problems with the EFB as one pilot commented, “glare on the 
screen and auto shutdown when it overheats.” 
 Pilots also reported that they did not like the EFB freezing during operations.  
Three pilots noted, “IPad sometimes freezes during critical phases of flight”, “JEPPESEN 
FD Pro app has become a little slower with a few bugs causing it to freeze up during a 
full city pair route change”, and “occasionally freezes or locks up.”  In addition to 
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locking up, other pilots note that applications sometimes crash.  “Sometimes the apps will 
crash, but they always come right back up.  So no real consequence except annoyance”, 
and another pilot states, “system crashes happen at the worst time. Login is laborious and 
required too often.” 
 Another complaint from respondents is the ability to only view one page at a time.  
This was echoed from numerous pilots with some responses indicating, “only 1 page at a 
time can be viewed”, “only one page available at a time”, and “can't cross reference more 
than one page at a time.” 
 One of the biggest complaints from pilots was the training that was received for 
operation of the Electronic Flight Bag.  One pilot bluntly stated, “Difficult to find 
information. Poor training.”  Another response indicated that, “I wish I had more training 
how to search out info from company manuels  [sic].”  Pilots also note that much of their 
software training is “trial and error” where one pilot stated, “every couple of months new 
software version come out, with no training or instruction on the changes, making it hard 
to become high proficient on the device. Most training on new software versions is the 
trial and error method.”  Yet another pilot commented that, “All the updates that are not 
user friendly, inability to get the big picture using international maps, the company 
updates which delete all saved notes and highlights, the complete lack of any type of 
training other than here it is and all the info is on the ipad to the point that you almost 
need 2 iPads, one to read through its operation and one to do it on while reading.” 
Pilot Comments Concerning EFBs 
 As the final question of the survey, pilots were asked for additional comments 
concerning the EFB.  There were 179 responses (N = 179).   Various themes in this 
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question also applied to the likes and dislikes of the EFB, so those answers were not 
considered applicable to this question.  Upon analysis of the valid responses, prevalent 
themes that emerged include:  distraction, the Federal Aviation Administration, the EFB 
as an improvement over previous applications, inefficiency, nuisances, safety, training, 
updates, and Wi-Fi. 
 Pilots indicated that the EFB is a distraction for various reasons.  One pilots notes 
that, "Cockpit placement is an issue. Company wants it midway back on the window. 
This causes a large amount of head movement to acquire and see the iPad. Moving it 
forward causes interference with outside references. All places bring it 
SIGNIFICANTLY closer to my eyes, creating a 4th visual range to acquire. (iPad, yoke, 
instruments, outside) My aircraft was not designed to integrate it's use (MD-11) Newer 
aircraft may do a better job at this."  Another response also concerned the positioning of 
the EFB by stating, "Having it off to the side is turning you away from looking ahead 
where your going on an approach or departure. If it's a complicated single engine take off 
too, it's not good to be looking away." One response stated that, "a good EFB is only as 
good as its mount."  Another pilot attributes unfamiliarity with the EFB as a distraction 
by responding, "there are certain times in high work load environment where I can see or 
have seen unfamiliarity with device or software that can hamper and distract if you are 
not fully comfortable or proficient in navigating the device."  One respondent agrees that 
the EFB can be a distraction but also adds, "EFBs aren't unsafe or a distraction unless the 
pilot mismanages it."  Another respondent indicates that the EFB can be a distraction to 
"unprofessional crews" by stating, "If texting and driving is bad, EFBs on flight decks are 
equally susceptible to be a distraction to unprofessional crews."  These distractions can 
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pose safety threats as one pilot notes, "People will tend to utilize off and online apps and 
materials on the EFB during flight as electronic gadgets are part of everyday life now.  
That might help with boredom, but for many, it is a distraction with potential safety 
issues."  
 Another theme that emerged from respondent comments was the issue of the 
Federal Aviation Administration regulations concerning the EFB.  One pilot notes that 
the functionality of the EFB is severely restricted by the FAA by saying, "Prohibition 
against using personal electronic devices on the flight deck is poorly thought out, 
counter-productive to flight management and can actually decrease safety.  There are a 
number of flight related applications that are available, updated and introduced that vastly 
improve the pilots ability to do his/her job on the flight deck.  By not allowing PED use 
on the flight deck the FAA is restricting pilots to an unnecessarily small 'toolkit' in the 
performance of their duties."  Other pilots agreed: "FAA needs to allow aircraft position 
displayed on charts -- arrival and departure, approaches and airfield diagrams.  I use it in 
my GA plane and it increases SA.  FAA needs to allow Internet access for real time 
weather, NOTAMS, ....", Not being able to utilize all functionality of programs.  Thank 
you FAA", and "once 'own ship' function of use is authorized it will enhance the ability 
and function of the EFB / (my personal aircraft has a Garmin 500 panel and 430W GPS 
that has safe taxi and moving map that I use)."  Still more pilots want more EFB 
functionality but are restricted by the FAA citing, "The FAA needs to approve inflight 
use of Wi-Fi for up-to-date weather information while enroute.  I also wish that we could 
go completely paperless and have dispatch releases pushed to the EFB."  This theme was 
also echoed by another response, "The FAA needs to face the fact that the EFB is the way 
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of the future and be less resistant to modernizing it. For instance, the use of the Internet 
on the flight deck to monitor rapidly changing weather conditions is an obvious 
improvement to safety but prohibited. "  The FAA is also unstandardized, according to 
another pilot, by stating, "FAA adoption is slow.   Each FSDO has their own idea.   If you 
have a FSDO without forward thinkers you are out of luck.    We need national regulation 
a new FAA chapter to govern the EFB..  right now it is a bunch of papers and FAA 
guidance but no unified set of regulations.   Open to too many opinions."   
 While safety issues have been cited by some pilots, other view the EFB as a vast 
improvement from the previous methods that the EFB replaced.  "All in all the EFB is a 
great tool and makes managing the flight deck easier. Like all technology there're times 
when it doesn't always work as advertised, but paper documents were cumbersome, time 
consuming to maintain, and the weight caused a lot of physics injuries."  One response 
stated, "...there is no going back to paper.  The efficiency and accuracy of access to 
information is light years beyond what we used to have.  It is a tremendous increase in 
safety, I believe."  One pilot stated that, "Any airline that doesn't do this [the EFB] is 
foolish."  There were other similar responses echoing the same response:  "EFBs are 
great, but I think they have a long way to go. They'll just get better with time", "I am 
getting used to it now and overall a very positive experience", "I think in time 
improvements will be made. It's an evolving technology", "I think it is a good product 
and will continue to improve and be a benefit to pilot situational awareness", "I think it is 
a great addition to the cockpit. Obviously there will be growing pains especially with the 
older pilots but anyone remotely familiar with an IPAD or windows based tablet will fine 
an EFB seamless and far more useful", "I think safety is improved because it is much 
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easier to determine the valid dates of the charts, especially charts with future effective 
dates", and "I think the EFB is a win. Much of it's success or failure can be tied to 
organizational implementation, as I've keyed in on. I believe that much more 
information- helpful information- is possible with the EFB. Information not currently 
taken advantage of at my company.  This would include real-time weather display, 
moving- map location information, performance data calculations, and interactive aircraft 
systems diagrams and information.  Essentially anything that would promote problem-
solving and information for safer decisions."  One respondent was initially skeptical of 
the EFB but relented by saying, "I was not initially a big fan of the idea. I was wrong. 
EFB is a vast improvement over paper charts."  A veteran pilot notes, "It's so easy to use 
and so natural, I can barely remember using paper charts even though I did so for 25+ 
years. Amazing."  Various pilots had the same response that "the positives outweigh the 
negatives", "Love it!", and "very pleased with the technology."  Other safety aspect 
included glare and overheating of the EFB.  " One response offered a solution to glare 
and overheating of the EFB stating, "include in the EFB program equipment a glare and 
heat relief sun shade system to reduce chances of iPad overheating and auto shutdown 
during a critical phase of operation.  There is a product available right now on the market 
which provides this protection to the sensitive electronic equipment, and UV plus 
Thermal protection for the crew members."   
 Various reports of EFB inefficiency were cited.  One pilots notes, "With two I-
Pads on the flight deck you cannot send or exchange information between the two units.  
With our hard wired EFB's a sharp F/O will send me the taxi chart on roll out or send me 
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the SID as I take the runway if it's my leg.  I like that."  This is a limitation of the iPad 
EFB that some pilots view as inefficient in their operations. 
 Safety issues, both positive and negative, were listed from pilots.  For the 
positive, some pilots believe that the EFB reinforces safety in their airline operations 
while others view the EFB as a detriment to safety.  Without much elaboration on the 
positive, many pilots indicated, "adds to cockpit safety", "Enhances safety and situational 
awareness in task loaded instances like runway change, arrival change, etc. 
", and "makes flying much more safe."  As a negative for safety, one pilots notes, 
"Applications closing and restarting on their own during approaches or critical phases of 
flight is dangerous. Very little training on how to solve iPad problems. Company 
provided help line phone number useless in a plane. Rely on individual knowledge of 
how to use iPads only works if you have had one before."  Many pilots reported 
applications closing and restarting and believed that this could have a negative safety 
impact on the flight.   
 Pilots cite training on the EFB, or lack thereof, as a problem.  One pilots notes, 
"totally unprepared to use the EFB when it was sprung on us. It took me to COS enroute 
to Honolulu to get the route loaded."  Another response indicated, "it is more convenient 
in some ways and less in others. I think that individual companies have better or worse 
implementation and update procedures. My company is terrible."  Lack of training was 
also cited, "our company went through two iterations of EFB.  The first was based on the 
Lufthansa LIDO system.  The training provided was lacking from the start.  Only through 
experience did a pilot really become comfortable with using the EFB.  This caused a 
significant amount of resistance from the pilot force.  Once the crew force became 
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comfortable and proficient with the LIDO system the company switched to Jeppesen and 
the process started over again.  This has led to wide variations in pilot proficiency and 
comfort with the current system.  Additionally, over a year ago the company introduced 
FAA authorized iPads containing the Jeppesen product.  Now it is not uncommon for one 
pilot to use the iPad version and the other to use the installed EFB.  This can lead to 
confusion and prevents the pilots from syncing or sharing data between terminals."  One 
respondent compares EFB training to aircraft training, "Training, training, training is 
everything. After all, they don't thrown me on a self study and then have me fly an 
airplane, there is more to it than that."  One surveyor agreed that the initial training was 
deficient but then stated, "Once I master how to find what information I need, this EFB 
will be excellent for me." 
 The issue of updating the EFB was a recurring theme in the responses.  Some 
airlines are updating frequently which has an overwhelming effect on many of the pilots.  
One participant noted, "Some items of importance can be overlooked, especially  when 
flying to new destinations. When receiving important bulletins, we are asked to 
authenticate several times instead of once which makes me feel like a child. Information 
overload because some writers of manuals and books are not telling us what is the 
objective or point of their message."  This information overload was also conveyed by 
noting that, "company manuals and bulletins have flowed into the EFB like Niagara 
Falls- too easy for the company to pump out information in haste.  Difficult to find 
information with multiple manuals.  I actually found it easier to reference a book in the 
past."  Along the same sentiments, another response read, " Bottom line is way to much 
information (not really an iPad issue, more of a company issue)."  Airlines are blamed for 
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this overwhelming amount of information updated on the EFB in the responses, "The 
easier it is for tech writers to write the more likely they will make changes to the 
materials and the result of increased changes will mostly likely go unnoticed," and "while 
the revision time is now approaching zero the amount of information / revisions has 
soared to the point of being unable to keep up . Company uses it to distribute propaganda 
that is useless in flight operations. I don't want the chief pilots hotline."  Updates also 
proved to create confusion among some pilots.  "Updating of my365 is confusing at 
times. Changes to procedures just update and you have a much harder time to identify 
and compare new with old. I think all procedural changes should be highlighted through 
paper backup and paper comparisons. It's way too easy to just update a computer and not 
see what changed." 
 Some pilots would like to see more functionality of the EFB for safety, namely 
allowing Wi-Fi access for real-time weather updates in-flight.  Notes one pilot, "using the 
Wi-Fi, which is currently prohibited in the flight deck would add so much more 
situational awareness relating to weather along route."  Another pilot echoed the same 
with, "in-flight data access (weather, etc.) would complete the promise of the device."  
One pilot believed that the Wi-Fi access would be beneficial in remote areas noting, "the 
company I work for doesn't utilize all aspects of the EFK.  Wireless access in the cockpit 
(on the ground) would increase weather/NOTAM situational awareness and allow a 
better route study just prior to departure, as we travel internationally and have very poor 
information at some remote locations." 
 Some responses stated merely that, "it sucks" but did not provide any elaboration 
on this sentiment. 
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Responses to Research Questions 
 
1.  What is pilot perception regarding the safety impact of EFBs in the flight deck?   
Of 470 valid responses, 92.77% either agreed or strongly agreed that they believe 
that EFB usage on the flight deck is safe.  Pilot responses to EFB safety on the 
flight deck indicated that there was a significant statistical positive correlation 
between airline rank and safety perception (r=.099 , p=.05). 
 
2.  Is the Electronic Flight Bag a distraction to pilots at Part 121 air carriers?  
94.26% of 470 valid pilot responses indicate that they do not believe that the EFB 
is a distraction to normal flight deck duties.  Responses to the survey revealed that 
distraction perception has a significant statistical positive correlation with the 
amount of total flight time (r=.099, p=.05). 
3.  Does the EFB increase perceived workload as opposed to traditional paper?   
88.3% of 470 valid pilot respondents perceive that their workload does not 
increase while using the EFB.  There were not significant statistical correlations 
between demographics and perceived workload. 
4.  Are there significant, demographic variations among pilot respondents?   
Pilot responses indicated various significant statistical correlations between 




Significant Statistical Correlations 
Experience Demographic Pearson’s r p 
Initial Training (Malfunction/Failures) Age -.149 .01 
Initial Training (Normal) Age -.184 .01 
Navigation Difficulty Age -.173 .01 
EFB Not Operating As Expected Age .098 .05 
Initial Training (Malfunction/Failures) Airline Rank .133 .01 
Navigation Difficulty Airline Rank .128 .01 
Initial Training (Normal) Airline Rank .101 .05 
Safety Airline Rank .099 .05 
Initial Training (Normal) Corrective Lenses .100 .05 
Navigation Difficulty Corrective Lenses .099 .05 
Initial Training (Normal) Education .110 .05 
Navigation Difficulty Education .108 .05 
Failure/Malfunction EFB Usage -.163 .01 
Navigation Difficulty Flight Time -.231 .01 
Distraction Flight Time .099 .05 
Information Overload Flight Time -.117 .05 
 
5.  What are pilot reported pros and cons of using an EFB? 
The common themes that emerged from the data indicated that pilots like the 
functionality aspects of the EFB, consolidation of resources, revision updating, 
convenience, efficiency, and the reduction in weight of the device.  Aspects that 
pilots do not like concerning the EFB are FAA restrictions on usage, battery life, 
manual highlights and bookmarks being lost with updating, slow processing 
speed, limited search capabilities, mounting location, difficulty locating items, 




 Issues that arise with pilots interfacing with an EFB in the flight deck need to be 
viewed from the human factor aspects in addition to the automation and how the two 
work in unison.  With several years of utilization available, pilots are now able to detail 
their experiences with EFB interaction.  Significant statistical correlations and pilot 
comments in the study allow researchers, manufactures, airlines and regulators a focal 




 When the demographic of age is considered, as pilot age increases, there is a 
negative correlation between initial training, both for normal and malfunction/failure, and 
navigation difficulty.  This would conclude that as pilot age increases the perception of 
training and navigation difficulty are less favorable.  In addition, as pilot age increases, 
there is a positive correlation with the EFB not operating as expected.  This indicates that 
as pilot age increases, there is an increase in the pilot experience of the EFB not operating 
as is to be expected. 
		
Airline Rank 
 The demographic of airline rank, Captain and First Officer, there is a positive 
correlation between initial training (both normal and malfunction/failures), navigation 
difficulty, and safety perception.  This indicates that Captains have a less favorable 
perception of the EFB in these areas. 
Corrective Lenses 
Pilots that wear corrective lenses have a significant positive correlation with 
initial training (normal operations) and navigation difficulty indicating that pilots that 
wear corrective lenses have a less favorable perception of initial training (normal 
operations) and increased navigation difficulty. 
Education 
 Interpretation of the data indicates that as education level increases, pilots have a 
positive correlation with initial training (normal operations) and navigation difficulty.  
Based upon the answer selections, pilots that have higher level of education have better 
perception of initial training (normal operations) and less issues with navigation 
difficulty. 
EFB Usage 
 A negative correlation exists between prior iPad or Surface usage and the failure 
or malfunction experience.  Pilots that have used an iPad or Surface prior to using one as 
an EFB have less perception of failures and malfunctions than pilots that have not. 
			 92	
Flight Time 
 When pilot flight time is considered, there is a significant positive correlation 
between flight time and distraction and a significant negative correlation between flight 
time and navigation difficulty and information overload.  Interpretation would indicate 
that as flight time increases, pilots believe that the EFB provides a sense of information 
overload and pilots have more difficulty navigating the EFB.  However, as flight time 
increases, pilots do not believe that the EFB is a distraction.   
 
Human Factors and the EFB 
 
Perceived Workload 
 Referencing Cahill (2006), “Electronic flight bag usability is critical to flight 
safety. Poor usability (inefficient task workflows and/or confusing information displays) 
can be costly in terms of pilot time/attention and overall workload.  Pilots are 
continuously prioritizing and sequencing flight tasks, at different points in flight… 
Evidently, problems in accessing/making landing calculations will distract pilots from the 
primary task of flying the aircraft safely, and could result in a loss of situation awareness 
at a critical point in flight.”  Based upon the research data, 88.30% of pilots do not 
perceive an increase in workload.  Perceived workload would also include the pilot’s 
difficulty in navigating the EFB, and 77.32% of respondents indicated that there is no 
perception of navigation difficulty.  As workload increases, pilots focusing attention to 
the EFB could lose situational awareness.  Data indicates that pilots experience of losing 
situational awareness related to the EFB are low with 79.79% having never experienced 
and another 18.7% losing situational awareness 1 percent – 9 percent of the time. 
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Distraction 
 Various reports and research previously mentioned detail the EFB as a distraction 
to pilots.  This can be detrimental to pilots during periods of high workload, thereby, 
threatening safety.  Since pilots have been using EFBs for up to five years on the flight 
deck and in many cases have become accustomed to their use, the data indicates that 
pilots do not perceive the EFB as a distraction with 94.26% pilots responding in the 
negative. 
 While a majority of pilots do not believe that the EFB is a distraction, details were 
presented in the comments that highlight potential issues.  The EFB, "provides 
distractions in cockpit when not used as flight equipment," and "distracting at critical 
moments on ground and in air switching between screens."  Other pilots note that, “ the 
position on the side window sometimes is distracting”, “distracting to have to swipe 
(sometimes through multiple pages) to get to diagram”, “EFBs aren't unsafe or a 
distraction unless the pilot mismanages it”, “ if texting and driving is bad, EFBs on flight 
decks are equally susceptible to be a distraction to unprofessional crews”, “EFBs…might 
help with boredom, but for many, it is a distraction with potential safety issues”, and 
“there are certain times in high work load environment where I can see or have seen 
unfamiliarity with device or software that can hamper and distract if you are not fully 
comfortable or proficient in navigating the device.” 
Training 
 Training for EFB usage on the flight deck was gauged from pilots on two fronts:  
normal operations and malfunction / failure.  Generally, pilots indicated that initial 
training on both fronts for EFB operations was lacking.  Concerning normal operations, 
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barely more than half of respondents indicated that initial training for normal operations 
was adequate at 50.11%.  When analyzing data for failures or malfunctions, 26.93% of 
pilots felt that their training was adequate.     
Future Studies 
 This study focused on a general overview of Electronic Flight Bag utilization 
since its widespread inception at Part 121 air carriers.  There was no limitation on the 
type of EFB, the software utilized, the particular airline, the type of aircraft flown, or the 
crew compliment.  These are areas that could be the focus of future studies to determine 
if there are significant differences between the various groups.  This would narrow the 
results for modifications to hardware or software changes, in addition to, training at the 
particular airline. 
 Other studies could include pilot observations in simulated conditions and 
measure their responses to workload, distraction, and efficiency with the EFB. 
Conclusions 
 While Electronic Flight Bags have been in use at airlines since 2010, the hardware 
and software aspects of them are very dynamic and require continuous training and 
adaption with the interface as they change.  Results from the survey indicate that pilot 
perception of the EFB generally is positive.  Pilots indicate there are areas of EFBs that 
need to be addressed with regulatory, airline, and manufacturer entities.  As EFBs 
continue to evolve, pilot input and perception can assist in shaping them to be user 











































Email Sent From a Professional Pilot Organization to its Members or  




My name is Donley Lytle, and I am completing my master's degree in aviation at the 
University of North Dakota. As a research study topic, I am conducting a survey of 
airline pilots at Part 121 airlines concerning their perception of Electronic Flight Bag 
safety in the flight deck.  I would like to ask for your help and let me know how you feel 
about using an EFB in your daily operations at work on the flight deck. 
 
The survey is completely anonymous and voluntary.  No data will be collected about you 
that could identify you, so your open and honest answers are appreciated. 
 
If you decide to do so, the survey will take about 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Please go to the following website to complete the survey:  http://und.qualtrics.com 
 












My name is Donley Lytle, and I am completing my master's degree in aviation at the 
University of North Dakota.  As a research study topic, I am conducting a survey of 
airline pilots at Part 121 airlines concerning their perception of Electronic Flight Bag 
safety in the flight deck.  I would like to ask for your help and let me know how you feel 
about using an EFB in your daily operations at work on the flight deck. 
 
The survey is completely anonymous and voluntary.  No data will be collected about you 
that could identify you, so your open and honest answers are appreciated. 
 
If you decide to do so, the survey will take about 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Please go to the following website to complete the survey:  http://und.qualtrics.com. 
 












Thank you for you participation in the survey. 
 
I am completing my master's degree in aviation from the University of North Dakota and 
am researching pilot perception towards Electronic Flight Bags (EFB) safety in the flight 
decks at Part 121 airlines.  The research is designed to focus on human factor issues that 
you face while interfacing with the EFB at work.  The results of the research will help to 
better understand pilot interaction with EFBs in a highly automated, attention-demanding 
environment. 
 
This survey is completely anonymous, and no data will be gathered from you that could 
identify you.  No identifying Internet information will be gathered, either, such as an IP 
address.  Your open and honest responses would be greatly appreciated.  At any point 
during the survey you may discontinue.  Completion or non-completion will not 
jeopardize you, your airline, or organization.   
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding the survey, please contact Donley Lytle 
at efbstudy@gmail.com or the University of North Dakota Institutional Review Board at 








1.  Are you presently employed as a pilot for a Part 121 air carrier in the United 
 States? 
   Yes  
   No  
 
2.  Do you use an Electronic Flight Bag as a pilot in the flight deck?  
   Yes  
   No  
 
3.  In what capacity do you utilize your Electronic Flight Bag on the flight deck? 
 (Check all that apply) 
   Charts (SID, STAR, Approach, Enroute, etc.)  
   Company Related Manuals (FOM, AOM, Training, etc.)  
   Performance  
   Weight and Balance  
 
4.  Where did you receive your primary flight instruction? 
   Military  
   Part 61 Flight School  
   Part 141 Flight School  
   Other    
 
5.  What is your current rank with your airline? 
   Captain  
   First Officer  
   Flight Engineer  
 
6.  What is your approximate total flight time? 
 
7.  What is your age? 
   younger that 20  
   20-29  
   30-39  
   40-49  
   50-59  
   60-64  
 
8.  Do you wear corrective lenses while working on the flight deck? 
    Yes  
 No 
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9.  What is your highest level of education completed? 
   High School  
   Associate's Degree (2 year)  
   Bachelor's Degree (4 year)  
   Post-Bachelor's Degree (Master's, Ph.D., JD, etc.)  
 
10.  Which version of Electronic Flight Bag do you use?  (Check all that apply) 
   Apple iPad  
   Microsoft Surface Tablet  
   Airport Performance Laptop Computer (APLC)  
   Onboard Performance Computer (OPC)  
   Other    
 
11.  Did you have prior experience with an iPad or Surface tablet prior to using it in 
 your current position as a pilot? 
   Yes  
   No  
 
12.  How long have you used an Electronic Flight Bag in the flight deck? (in years) 
 
13.  Do you believe that the use of an EFB on the flight deck adds to your workload? 
   Yes  
   No  
 
14.  Do you believe that the EFB is a distraction to your normal flight deck duties? 
   Yes  
   No  
 
15.  Do you feel that the EFB gives you a sensation of information overload? 
   Yes  
   No  
 
16.  Do you have difficulty navigating the EFB, for example, switching between 
applications? 
    Yes  
 No 
 
17.  Do you feel that your initial Electronic Flight Bag training was adequate to be 
 proficient in normal flight operations? 
   Strongly Disagree  
   Disagree  
   Neither Agree nor Disagree  
   Agree  
   Strongly Agree  
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18.  Do you feel that your initial Electronic Flight Bag training was adequate to 
 prepare you for malfunctions or failures? 
   Strongly Disagree  
   Disagree  
   Neither Agree nor Disagree  
   Agree  
   Strongly Agree  
 
19.  In your experience, at what frequency has the Electronic Flight Bag failed or 
 malfunctioned? 
   I have never experienced an Electronic Flight Bag failure or malfunction  
   1-24%  
   25-49%  
   50-74%  
   more than 75%  
 
 
20.  What percentage of time has the EFB operated in a manner that you were not 
 expecting? 
   It always performs as I expect it to  
   1% - 9%  
   10% - 24%  
   25% - 49%  
   50% - 74%  
   more than 75%  
 
21.  What percentage of time have you lost situation awareness in the flight deck due 
 to the Electronic Flight Bag? 
   I have never lost situational awareness as a result of the Electronic Flight 
 Bag  
   1% - 9%  
   10% - 24%  
   25% - 49%  
   50% - 74%  
   more than 75%  
   
22.  Do you feel that utilization of the Electronic Flight Bag on the flight deck is safe? 
   Strongly Disagree  
   Disagree  
   Neither Agree nor Disagree  
   Agree  





23.  If you had your choice in the flight deck, would you prefer to use an Electronic 
 Flight Bag, paper or a combination of the two? 
   Electronic Flight Bag  
   Paper  
   Combination of Electronic Flight Bag and Paper  
 
24.  Please elaborate on your selection of a combination of both an Electronic Flight 
 Bag and paper. 
 
25.  What are positive aspects of using an Electronic Flight Bag? 
 
26.  What are negative aspects of using an Electronic Flight Bag? 
 
27.  Additional comments concerning the Electronic Flight Bag. 
 
28.  If you would like to participate in a follow-up interview via email to help the 
 researcher ascertain some of the results, please enter your email address.  (This 
 information is confidential and will only be revealed to the researcher.) 
 
29.  After the survey is complete and the results are reviewed, would you like to be 
 included in a follow-up study to help the researcher interpret those results?  (You 
 identity will remain anonymous and personal information will be kept 
 confidential.) 
  Yes 
  No 
 
30.  Please provide your email address for follow-up contact by the researcher.  (This 
 information will be kept confidential and the researcher will only contact you by 
 email.)  
 
  Email Address 
 
31.  After the survey is complete, would you like to receive a copy of the study? 
  Yes 
  No 
 
29.  Please enter your email address to receive a copy of the study once it is 
 published.  (This information will be kept confidential.) 
  Email Address 
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